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Abstract
Economic Shocks and Household Decisions
Jennifer Milosch
This dissertation concerns various types of economic shocks and the implica-
tions of such shocks on the decisions of households. There has been a long history
in the theoretical economics literature of modeling agents as forward-looking and
thus in making their life-cycle decisions they will have accounted for the paths they
expect their income, wealth, or economic opportunities to take. Therefore, these
chapters will focus on households’ responses to unexpected changes in economic
factors. The two types of economic shocks to be explored are income shocks, a
shock that will affect only one spouse, and house price shocks, a shock that affects
both spouses. Particular care is given to trying to identify exogenous and unex-
pected changes in income or wealth for the households. The asymmetric responses
to financial gains versus losses are explored for each type of shock.
Throughout the analyses are conducted using longitudinal data on individuals
or households. These data allow for observations of the sample household through
a long portion of its life cycle and through changes in their economic situation.
In the first chapter, I explore the effects of unpredicted changes in permanent
income of each spouse on the probability of divorce for the couple. I find that
ix
if the husband experiences a negative income shock, the probability of divorce
increases. If the wife experiences a negative income shock, this effect on divorce
is only true if she had a switch into unemployment. In Chapter 2, I continue the
analysis of economic shocks on probability of divorce by looking at responses to
local house price shocks. These local housing prices give us changes in wealth for
the households that are exogenous to many of the other decisions an individual
household makes. In response to a positive house price shock, the risk of divorce
decreases for couples. Finally in the third chapter, I analyze the effect of hous-
ing prices on another household behavior: labor supply choices. Married female
homeowners are less likely to be employed following a positive house price shock
in their metropolitan area. Conversely, older married male homeowners are more
likely to be employed when there are negative house price shocks in their area.
Professor S. Lundberg
Dissertation Committee Chair
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Introduction
In the past few decades the United States and the rest of the world has ex-
perienced a great deal of economic volatility. These large and often unexpected
changes in the nation’s economy begs the question of how such changes have af-
fected households in the United States. In particular, how do households adjust
their behavior in response to changes in their economic situation? This disserta-
tion attempts to address this question for different types of economic shocks and
estimate how they affect the household’s decisions on divorce and labor supply.
The availability of long-lasting longitudinal data gives us the ability to observe
households or individuals over a long portion of their married and working lives.
This means we can continually observe the household’s characteristics over time
and see when and how they respond to changes in their economic situation.
Household decisions depend on a number of factors and characteristics, how-
ever arguably one of the most important of these is the economic environment
they face which in turn helps to determine the household’s budget constraint.
1
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The wealth of a household comes from many different sources and in these chap-
ters we will look at two contributing sources: labor earnings and owner-occupied
housing.
A couple chooses to marry based on the information that they have available to
them at the time of marriage. If the expected surplus of the marriage is positive,
then it is beneficial for the couple to marry. As in Burdett and Coles (1997), we
can consider that there is some set of characteristics of each spouse that determines
their quality as a partner and thus the surplus of the marriage. It seems realistic
to assume that the expected financial situation of the spouses and the household
play a role in the gains to marriage. As the economic situation of the household
changes, at some point the surplus of the marriage could dip below zero. This
means that at a later date it is may no longer be optimal for the marriage to
continue. The first two chapters will thus explore samples of married households
and their changing economic situations.
Chapter 1 analyzes the effect of income shocks on marital stability by estimat-
ing unpredicted changes in permanent income in each year. Using a long cohort
survey, the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth of 1979, we observe individuals
from a young age through a long portion of their lives. The information available
up until each year is used to generate a prediction of permanent income, and
then update in each subsequent year with the new information revealed in the
2
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survey. In this chapter, a “shock” to income is defined as the difference of the
prediction of permanent income this year as compared to the prediction at the
time of marriage. The results show that the probability of divorce increases when
the husband faces a negative income shock. The same is only true for the wife
when her negative income shock is due to a switch into unemployment.
Chapter 2 concerns how shocks to housing prices affect the decision to divorce
for homeowners. Compared to the previous chapter, this type of economic shock is
something that occurs to both spouses, rather than affecting the earnings brought
in by only one spouse. Residential housing has been the largest component of
household wealth for the past several decades so shocks to housing prices likely
represent large changes in wealth for these households. In this chapter household
level data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics is used, providing a broad
sample of household types. Using variation in local housing prices while con-
trolling for local labor market conditions, we find that the probability of divorce
decreases in response to positive house price shocks, however no significant effect
is found for negative shocks. This effect is strongest among households with lower
socioeconomic status, perhaps because the wealth shock is relatively larger for
them.
In Chapter 3 of this dissertation a different type of household decision is dis-
cusses: labor supply and labor force participation choices of households. Using
3
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the same metropolitan level house price shocks faced by the respondents of the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we focus in on groups that are likely to be less
attached to the labor force. First, the results show that married female homeown-
ers decrease their hours of work in response to positive house price shocks. We
can show that this effect is due to these women adjusting on the extensive margin
of labor supply. Since the effect is strongest among women with young children
it seems likely that these women are choosing to exit the labor market to care for
their children at home. Older married males, on the other hand, increase their
labor hours in response to negative house price shocks. This also is shown to be
from the men choosing whether or not to work.
Through these research endeavors I have found evidence that economic factors,
both individual and more aggregate ones, are important determinants of house-
hold decisions. In general prosperity increases marital stability whereas economic
hardships destabilize the relationship. Changes in their economic opportunities
also lead households to adjust their decisions regarding work in the labor market.
An increase in housing wealth allows married women to exit the labor market and
care for their children and a decrease in housing wealth means older males are
more likely to remain in the labor market, likely through delaying retirement.
4
Chapter 1
The Effects of Unpredicted
Changes in Income on the
Probability of Divorce
1.1 Introduction
A large number of studies have found that there has been rising income volatil-
ity at different times throughout the past several decades. There is evidence of
this phenomenon from numerous data sources and this volatility has important
implications for consumption smoothing, poverty, and consumer well-being.1 Dur-
ing the same time period, there were large changes in the environment of marriage
and divorce in the United States. According to Kreider and Ellis (2011) using data
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), 21% of males and
23% of females 15 and older have ever been divorced. Figure 4.4 from Stevenson
1A few of these studies discussing income volatility are Gottschalk and Moffitt (2009) and
Dynan et al. (2012) using PSID data, and Leete and Bania (2010) using SIPP data.
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Figure 4.4 from Stevenson and Wolfers (2011)
and Wolfers (2011) shows that the number of divorces per 1000 married couples
has risen from about 8 in 1960 to a peak in the early 1980s of about 22 and has
been falling slowly, but steadily, ever since. Since divorce is so widespread, it is
potentially very costly, and the observed income volatility, the goal of this paper
is to examine income shocks as one potential determinant of marital stability.
How do unexpected changes in income affect the probability of divorce? If
high permanent income is a desirable characteristic in a spouse for both men
and women, an increase in permanent income should make an individual a more
attractive spouse than before, and a decrease in permanent income should decrease
6
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spousal quality. First I forecast the permanent income of both the respondent of
the survey and his/her spouse at each year of marriage given all the information
that is available up until that date. These forecasts can be viewed as what the
couple expected permanent income to be at each year of their marriage. I assume
that any changes in these predictions over time are “surprises” due to the new
information learned in the past year. In this way, I analyze the effect of these
unexpected changes on the divorce hazard. The evidence shown in this paper
suggests that unexpected decreases in income for males increase the probability
of divorce and is robust to many specifications. On the other hand, we see a similar
effect on the divorce hazard only when the wife has a negative income shock due
to a switch into unemployment. The effects of these shocks to income are explored
across different subsamples. I explore who faces positive and negative changes in
predicted permanent income to look for similarities among these groups. Finally,
several models of marriage and matching are discussed. The empirical results are
compared to the models’ predictions on the effect of changes in permanent income.
To illustrate these results, Figure 1.2 shows the fraction divorcing in a given
year across deciles of the income shocks for the husbands and the wives. The
fraction divorcing in a given year is much higher for those males with large negative
shocks, and relatively flat for males with positive income shocks. For women, there
possibly a slightly positive trend across the figure but certainly not as clear as for
7
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Figure 1.2: Fraction Divorcing by Income Shock Decile
the males. On both panels the fraction divorcing is the lowest for the decile
including zero, which would be only very small changes in predicted permanent
income.
The analysis in this paper is most closely related to Weiss and Willis (1997)
(hereafter WW). The results in WW show that when there is a positive shock to
the woman’s earnings, a marriage is more likely to end in divorce. Conversely,
an unexpected increase in the man’s earnings means the marriage is less likely to
end in divorce. The authors note, however, that expected earnings at the time
of marriage have no effect on the probability of divorce; it is only surprises that
matter. The divorce hazard also rises for negative surprises to earnings. The
event that causes the largest increase in the divorce hazard in their data is when
the husband has a negative shock to earnings and the wife has a positive shock to
earnings. They posit that an increase in the woman’s earnings is more important
when she is single than when she is married. Thus, higher earnings means she is
8
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more capable of living on her own and the divorce hazard rises. So the argument in
WW is one of gains from marriage: an increase in the woman’s earnings decreases
gains from marriage, while an increase in the man’s earnings increases the gains.
The paper fits into the literature in the following way. First, a panel data set
more than twice as long with smaller gaps between interviews is used as compared
to Weiss and Willis (1997). This means that the respondents are seen for a longer
portion of their lives, and are significantly older in the most recent surveys. As
the goal is to identify permanent changes in income, this is better established if
we are able to see the individuals in their peak earnings years. Second, I attempt
to more accurately identify changes in income that are “surprises” to the couple.
The analysis is also expanded to explore potential non-linearities in the effects for
positive versus negative income shocks, the direction of each spouse’s shock, and
across income and education levels.
1.1.1 Review of the Literature
Related to this paper, there are several paper that aim to estimate shocks to
income and analyze the effect on divorce. Becker, Landes and Michael (1977)
approaches this question using cross-sectional data, so there the researchers can-
not see one couple learning about each spouse’s quality over time. Bo¨heim and
Ermisch (2001) uses data from the U.K. that asks respondents about the financial
9
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situation of their spouses and expectations for next year about the financial situa-
tion of their spouses. Changes from expectations are recorded, and they find that
positive changes in expectations decrease the divorce risk. Charles and Stephens
(2004) finds that a spouse’s job displacement increases the probability of divorce,
however loss of job due to disability does not. The effect of job loss on divorce
is further explored in Doiron and Mendolia (2012) using the British Household
Panel Survey distinguishing between reasons for displacement. The authors find
that job loss due to dismissals increase the risk of divorce. Nunley and Seals
(2010) examine household income shocks and finds that transitory increases in
household income decrease the likelihood of divorce, and decreases in household
income increase the likelihood of divorce.
The theoretical literature on marriage and divorce goes back to A Theory of
Marriage: Parts I and II in Becker (1973) and (1974), which focused on a static
model with no frictions. He examines the attractive traits of a marriage partner
in Part I and settings with different types of uncertainty for Part II in Becker
(1974). We expect that some characteristics of individuals are complementary in
marriage which leads to positive assortive matching and others that are substitutes
leading to negative assortive matching. More recent papers use dynamic marriage
models allowing for endogenous divorce to arise within the environemnt: Cornelius
(2003) and Rasul (2006). Cornelius (2003) presents a model where divorce occurs
10
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as individuals continue to search for a better spouse while married. In this model,
individuals will accept an early match that is not ideal, knowing that they can
remarry once they find a better match. In Rasul (2006) there is learning about the
quality of a marriage. First, an individual sees an imperfect signal about the match
quality of a potential spouse. Once married, both learn the true quality of the
match in the following period. In this way, divorce may be the optimal response
for one or both parties once the true quality is realized. The relationship between
income uncertainty and marriage is explored in Hess (2004) where individuals may
marry for love or in order to hedge the risk of income shocks. The author finds
that if income uncertainty is resolved later on in life, those couples who provide
good income insurance for one another are more likely to stay together. On the
other hand if income uncertainty is revealed relatively quickly, those couples are
more likely to divorce if they do not have enough love in the marriage.
1.2 Data
The focus of this paper is on the effects of changes in income over time, and
so the data used is a panel study that tracks individuals through a large portion
of their life. The National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY79)2 had its initial
interview in 1979 when the individuals were between the ages of 14-22. This initial
2Data obtained through the Bureau of Labor Statistics: NLSY (2012)
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interview will allow us to see people as they are completing their educational
choices and just entering into marriages and the labor force. The survey was
administered annually from 1979 to 1994 and has since continued bi-annually. As
of 2008, 61.2% of the original respondents were still participating in the survey.
This survey is long lasting, so the respondents can be observed into their high
income years, which the BLS estimates to be between 45-55 years of age. The
final interview currently available is for 2010 when the respondents are between
45 and 53.
The NLSY79 is comprised of three sampling groups. First, there were 6,111
members of the cross-sectional sample designed to be nationally representative of
the noninstitutionalized, civilian population in 1979. Second, there were 5,295
members of a supplemental sample that over-sampled black, Hispanic, and non-
black/non-Hispanic disadvantaged individuals. Last, there were 1,280 members
of a sample of active members of the military. The majority of the military
sample and the whole of the non-black/non-Hispanic disadvantaged respondents
were dropped from the survey in 1984 and 1990, respectively, and thus are not
included in this study. The final sample contains a total of 9,735 respondents.
In a similar study, Weiss and Willis (1997) use data from the NLS High School
Class of 1972 (NLS-72). This survey is similar in form to the NLSY79, however
it is a much shorter and infrequent panel with only 6 interviews over 14 years
12
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from high school graduation until the respondents are age 32. While the NLS-72
used in WW has slightly better retention of respondents and more information on
the spouses of respondents, the NLSY79 has a panel that spans 32 years which
arguably makes it better suited to this endeavor. In addition, the NLSY79 has
smaller gaps between interviews than the NLS-72 in which respondents were only
surveyed in 1972, 1973, 1974, 1976, 1979, and 1986. The NLSY79 has respondents
born between 1957-1965.
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics for NLSY79
1979-1985 1986-1992 1993-2000 2002-2010
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Time Invariant:(a)
Black-R 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.36
Hispanic-R 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25
Female-R 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.52 0.50
Years of Educ Father-R 11.9 3.59 11.9 3.59 11.9 3.58 11.9 3.59
Years of Educ Mother-R 11.7 2.78 11.7 2.77 11.6 2.76 11.6 2.77
Age First Married-R 24.6 5.69 24.6 5.71 24.6 5.77 24.5 5.85
Age First Married-Sp 24.9 5.73 24.9 5.74 24.9 5.81 24.8 5.75
Length of First Marr.(b) 9.28 6.87 9.31 6.89 9.42 6.92 9.54 6.98
Time Varying:
Age-R 20.6 3.05 28.0 3.12 35.1 3.43 44.9 3.53
Age-Sp 22.5 5.73 29.5 5.44 36.6 5.71 46.5 5.80
Years of Educ-R 11.9 2.08 13.1 2.35 13.4 2.47 13.6 2.53
Number of Children-R 0.28 0.66 0.97 1.14 1.55 1.31 1.85 1.37
Own Property 0.13 0.34 0.36 0.48 0.60 0.50 0.72 0.45
Weeks Worked-R 31.8 20.0 39.6 18.8 41.6 18.5 41.5 19.2
Weeks Worked-Sp 39.9 18.0 41.3 18.2 41.4 18.6 41.2 19.4
Income-R $13,510 $13,378 $26,360 $21,433 $34,088 $31,545 $42,498 $46,670
Income-Sp $23,335 $18,566 $31,018 $25,009 $35,021 $32,936 $43,735 $50,423
Currently Married-R 0.23 0.42 0.53 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.64 0.48
Currently Divorced-R 0.02 0.14 0.08 0.27 0.13 0.34 0.18 0.38
(a) Changes in time-invariant variables are due to respondents dropping out of the survey over time.
(b) This is tenure for marriages that have ended. This is the length until separation or divorce. Marriages
that continue beyond the final interview will not affect these values.
NOTES- R indicates values are for the respondents of the survey, Sp indicates values are for the current
spouses of the respondents. Sample weights are used.
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Summary statistics for the NLSY79 are broken down into four time periods
and are reported in Table 1.1 for the years of 1979-1985, 1986-1992, 1993-2000,
and 2002-2010. The initial sample is almost exactly 50% female and has 15%
blacks and 7% Hispanics. The average years of education for a respondent is
increasing from 11.9 to 13.6 over the length of the sample indicating that some
individuals continued their schooling through at least part of the survey. Both
males and females obtain similar amounts of schooling on average at 12.4 years
and 12.6 years respectively. As expected, female respondents earn less than male
respondents throughout the sample. Among the respondents who are working,
women earn 22% less in hourly wages and 45% less in income. The discrepancy
in these percentages is likely due to the fact that women also work fewer hours
during their childbearing years. Interestingly, the gap between men and women in
income worsens over time going from 40.6% before 1995 and 57.7% after amongst
men and women who were working. A similar change is noted in wages where the
wage gap increases from 18.7% to 27.3% over the same intervals.
The averages for the marriage and divorce variables give a quick look into
the family structures of the respondents. We see that on average, first marriages
that end within the 32 years of the sample last about 9 years and the median
length is 7 years when considering the end of marriage to be either divorce or
separation, whichever happens first. The legal process of divorce can often take
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several years, so to more accurately measure the end of the relationship the date
of legal separation is used, if the couple separates before divorcing. In comparison,
the median length of time from marriage to the final date of divorce is 8 years
in the NLSY79. As expected we see that the percentages of respondents who are
married or divorced is increasing over time, and by the end of the sample 64% are
currently married and 18% are currently divorced.
1.3 Empirical Methods
The first step in the empirical estimation is to create a measure of permanent
income for the respondents. WW use income at age 32 as a proxy for permanent
income, as it is the age of the respondents in the last year of the NLS-72 sur-
vey. They assume that income at age 32 is a good indicator for an individual’s
permanent income. However, according to Solon (1992), there is significant errors-
in-variables bias associated with using a single year’s income as a measure of the
permanent component of income. To mitigate some of this bias, the measure of
permanent income used is as follows. Let Y permi be the average of log of incomes
of respondent i across three years, a proxy for permanent income. The incomes
that are used are those at the ages of 41, 43, and 45 or the ages of 42, 44, and
46.3 This average is a better estimate of permanent income since the respondents
3These are for every other year as the survey was only conducted bi-annually after 1994.
Because of this fact, I may miss some respondents if I only use income at the ages of 41, 43,
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are closer to their peak earnings years and taking the average of incomes works to
reduce the potential for an unusual income in one year to be driving the shocks.
Several authors including Solon (1992) and Mayer (1997) have suggested that an
average of variables across years reduces the errors-in-variables bias associated
with measuring permanent income.
In each year, beginning at age 20, I predict permanent income of the respondent
using the information available up until that year. Once the respondent marries,
the couple must decide in every year whether to stay in the marriage or not.
To see the effects of surprises in predicted permanent income on this decision,
all of the relevant new information available in the data is incorporated into the
predictions in each year. This is an attempt to capture expectations about their
future financial state, perhaps much like the couple would do themselves. As the
effects of the variables could be different for men and women, they are estimated
separately. First we estimate:
log(Y permi ) = α20 ∗ zi + β′20 ∗ xi,20 + δ20 ∗ log(Yi,20) + vi,20 + upermi (1.1)
zi are characteristics that do not change over time, such as race and parents’
education. xi,20 are time-varying characteristics, like marital and employment
and 45. For example, if an individual was 42 in 2002, 44 in 2004, and 46 in 2008, I would never
observe income at the ages of 41, 43, and 45.
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status, at age 20. log(Yi,20) is log of income at age 20. Finally in the error
term is vi,20, the portion of permanent income not explained by the information
at age 20, and upermi , the unexplained variation in permanent income. Several
controls are added that are not included in the analysis by WW in an attempt to
more accurately capture surprises. One of the difficulties for measuring surprises
for women in the sample involves fertility decisions. For instance, a couple may
choose to have a child and so the woman stops working suddenly. Since this
is not a “surprise” change in her income, we want to account for this in the
predictions of permanent income. Control variables are included for the presence
of young children in the household (less than 5 years old), and for the wife being
pregnant (an indicator variable equal to 1 in the year before a birth occurs).4 Using
Equation 1.1, I generate fitted values of the log of permanent income with the
information at age 20, log(Y pi,20). To generate the prediction of permanent income
at age 21, we include log(Y pi,20) in the regression. Thus, the age 21 prediction
includes the new information observed at age 21 and the past history prior to
that age through log(Y pi,20). Note that the time-invariant characteristics are no
longer included in this regression as their effects will have been incorporated into
4The full set of control variables used in the income regressions for respondents are: year
fixed effects, race, religion, parent’s educations, AFQT scores, family poverty status, education,
expected educational attainment, region of residence, an indicator for the presence of young
children, an indicator for the wife being pregnant, employment status, hours per week working,
indicator for married, occupation by 3-digit census code, and income.
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the prediction from age 20.
log(Y permi ) = γi,t−1 ∗ log(Y pi,t−1) + β′t ∗ xi,t + δt ∗ log(Yi,t) + vi,t + upermi (1.2)
for t=21,...,40
This is repeated in each year using the the new values of the control variables
and the previous year’s predicted permanent income. The variable log(Y pi,t−1) is
the log of the previous year’s predicted permanent income and log(Yit) is the log
of the current year’s income. By including the previous prediction and any new
information, we construct a measure that captures the cumulative innovations to
permanent income. This is then repeated for the ages of 22-40. The goal with
these estimations is to control for as many variables as possible that may affect
the respondent’s forecasts of their own permanent income at a given point in
time. Once we control for these variables, both for the current year and their past
values reflected in log(Y pi,t−1), any remaining variation in the predicted permanent
income is taken to be a surprise change in income for the respondent.
The set of predictions for every age, log(Y pi,20)-log(Y
p
i,40), are used to estimate
the effect of income shocks on divorce. What is the relevant reference point
for the couple in determining what is surprise that can affect their decision to
divorce? One natural way of thinking of a “shock” to the couple is how different
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the predicted permanent income is in the current year, compared to what it was
when the couple married.
∆log(Y permi,t ) = log(Y
p
i,t)− log(Y pi,M)
Positive differences would indicate the respondent expects permanent income to
be larger than was expected at the time of marriage, and negative differences
indicate expected permanent income has decreased. Thus an income shock in
this paper is defined as a change in predicted permanent income compared to the
predicted permanent income at the date of marriage.
1.4 Results
A probit model is used to estimate the effects of changes in predicted perma-
nent income on the divorce hazard in each year after the start of the first marriage.
The dependent variable equals zero in years where the couple is married, one in
the year the couple divorces (if ever), and then missing for the rest of the sam-
ple. Since this is a divorce hazard model, the marginal effects will be interpreted
as their effect on the probability the dependent variable equals one (the couple
divorces) in a particular year. The regressions are pooled across years so observa-
tions are in the person-year format. The interpretation of the coefficients are the
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effect on the probability of divorce in a particular year, conditional on the couple
reaching a particular year of marriage. Also, since the income at age 41, 43, and
45 or 42, 44, and 46 is used in constructing the permanent income variable the
following analysis is performed only for respondents who are younger than 41.
Two different approaches are used in the analysis. In Section 1.4.1, the pre-
dicted income of the spouse is not controlled for; this leads to unbiased estimates
only if the spouse’s income shocks are orthogonal to the respondents. This ini-
tial methodology is used because data on the spouses is somewhat limited in
the NLSY79. So, the results in this first section have a larger sample size. In
Section 1.4.2, changes in both the husband and the wife’s predicted permanent
income will be included to the best extent possible. In all regressions, standard
errors are clustered on the respondent ID number as each person appears in the
data multiple times. The number of categories for clustering that appears at the
bottom of each table describes the number of marriages the analysis is based on.
1.4.1 Respondents’ Permanent Income Changes
Table 1.2 shows the marginal effects of the variables of interest from various
specifications of a probit regression. The specification includes other controls that
may affect the quality of marriage and probability of divorce. To allow for the
possibility that positive and negative shocks to income do not have symmetric
effects on the divorce hazard, the income shock variable is separated into its
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positive and negative components. For example, households may exhibit what is
known as loss aversion in the behavioral economic literature where agents dislike
losses more than they like gains. The equations to be estimated are variations of:
divi,t = γ1,t ∗ Pos. ∆Perm. Inc + γ2,t ∗Neg. ∆Perm. Inc + α′t ∗ xi,t + ui,t (1.3)
Where log(Y pi,t) is the log of predicted permanent income in year t and log(Y
p
i,M)
is the predicted permanent income at marriage, and xi,t are various other control
variables. Define
Pos. ∆Perm. Inc=
[
log(Y pi,t)− log(Y pi,M)
]
∗ 1(Positive) to be the change in
predicted permanent income if that change is positive and zero if the change is
non positive. Likewise, define
Neg. ∆Perm. Inc=
[
−(log(Y pi,t)− log(Y pi,M))
]
∗ 1(Negative) to be the absolute
change in predicted permanent income if the change is negative and zero if the
change is non negative. This way, we can directly analyze the potentially different
effects of a negative change in predicted permanent income and a positive one.
In Column (1) of Table 1.2, the specification has a linear function in the
change in permanent income for both the positive and the negative changes, and
Column (2) has a quadratic function in the change in permanent income. Column
(3) and column (4) separate between female and male respondents. In Column
(1) and Column (2), we see some evidence that positive changes in permanent
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Table 1.2: Effect on Divorce Probability
All Respondents Females Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pos. ∆Perm. Inc.t−1 0.0060** 0.0187*** 0.0094*** 0.0016
(0.0025) (0.0060) (0.0031) (0.0039)
Neg. ∆Perm. Inc.t−1 -0.0011 0.0018 -0.0030 0.0050
(0.0021) (0.0049) (0.0024) (0.0033)
Pos. ∆Perm. Inc.2t−1 - -0.0066** - -
- (0.0028) - -
Neg .∆Perm. Inc.2t−1 - -0.0005 - -
- (0.0013) - -
Year Controls Y Y Y Y
N (Person-Year) 23,670 23,670 11,685 11,985
Couples 2,647 2,647 1,240 1,407
R2 0.061 0.062 0.081 0.065
Custom weights constructed for the NLSY79 are used. Standard errors are in parenthe-
ses, clustered by person ID. Marginal effects are reported. *,**,*** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
income increase the probability of divorce, however the separation of men and
women may to be important. In Column (3) for the females, the coefficient on
the positive changes in predicted permanent income is positive and significant.
This suggests that positive income shocks for women increase the probability
of divorce, assuming their income shocks are orthogonal to their husbands. In
Column (4), without including any measure of income shocks for the wives, the
male respondents do not show any significant effect of income shocks.5
5All of the specifications have the other control variables shown in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
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1.4.2 Controlling for Spouse Predictions
There are many reasons why we might believe that surprises to permanent
income of the spouses are related to those of the respondents. For example, lo-
cal labor market conditions might affect both individuals. If the respondent and
his/her spouse’s shocks to permanent income are not orthogonal, we must con-
trol for the predicted permanent income of both. The NLSY79 and other cohort
surveys are focused on the respondent rather than the household. Therefore, in-
formation on a spouse of a respondent is not observed until the couple marries,
and information is no longer observed once the marriage ends. This presents a
problem with predicting the permanent income of the first spouse of each respon-
dent. Again, for the respondents, the proxy for permanent income used is the
average of income in the data across three specific years: when the respondents
are 41, 43, and 45, or 42, 44, and 46. For the respondents’ first spouses, however,
income will only be observed in these years if the first marriage was still intact
at that time. The income data the spouses will be missing if they have divorced
before those ages.
To address this issue, Weiss and Willis (1997) use an alternative strategy to
construct predicted permanent income for the spouses. For the male spouses of
the female respondents, we use the estimated coefficients from the regressions for
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the male respondents. By taking these coefficients and multiplying them by the
explanatory variables of the male spouses of the female respondents, predicted
permanent income at each age is constructed. A second set of restricted perma-
nent income regressions are estimated for the respondents, including only variables
that are also available for spouses in the NLSY79. The set of explanatory vari-
ables used in these regressions that are available for both the respondents and
the spouses are: race, education6, income, weeks employed, family poverty sta-
tus, weeks unemployed, hours per week, a dummy variable for young children, a
dummy variable for a woman being pregnant, occupation by 3-digit census code,
region of residence, and religion.
Recall that for the respondents the prediction of permanent income was gen-
erated using Equation A.3. In these regressions the important feature is the
calculations of innovations to expectations of permanent income given the new
information in the current year controlling for the previous year’s predicted per-
manent income. Given that an income shock is the cumulative change in predicted
permanent income since marriage, we want to ensure the prediction in the year
of marriage is as accurate as possible. Since there is no information prior to mar-
riage about the spouses we will not have any measure of last year’s predicted
6Education of spouse is not reported in the NLSY79, so multivariate matching on race,
education, and income by age and sex of the respondent is used to predict the education level
of the spouses. Census and ACS data from the relevant cohorts is used (Ruggles et al. (2010))
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permanent income for the spouses in the year of marriage. To obtain a mea-
sure of the past history of the spouses prior to marriage, multivariate matching
from respondents to spouses is used to generate a variable log(Y Sppi,M−1) for each
spouse for the year prior to marriage. Essentially this constructs the unknown
past history of the spouses whose information is not observed before marriage.
We match respondents to spouses separately by age and sex over the variables of
region of residence, education, race, presence of young children, and the woman
being pregnant. Thus, the predictions of permanent income for the spouses begins
at the age of first marriage, and the effect of past history on permanent income in
the year of first marriage is log(Y Sppi,M−1). For a more detailed description of the
methodology used, see equations A.1 and A.3 in the appendix. This yields the
predicted permanent income for the male spouse of female respondent i in at each
age they are married between the ages of 20-40, log(Y Sppi,20), ..., log(Y Sp
p
i,40) and
an equivalent set of predictions for the female spouses of the male respondents. As
was done for the survey respondents, the cumulated change over time in predicted
permanent income is calculated so the variable of interest will be
∆log(Y Sppermi,t ) = log(Y Sp
p
i,t)− log(Y Sppi,M)
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or what we will refer to as ∆ Perm. Inc.7
Figure 1.3: Size of Change in Predicted Permanent Income
Figure 1.3 shows the relative size of the change in permanent income from
one year to the next for all of the males and females. Note, from the figure
it appears that females have a larger spread of changes in predicted permanent
income than males. This may suggest that the methodology used does a slightly
worse job predicting permanent income for women. If this procedure on average
is predicting permanent income correctly the means of the change in predicted
permanent income is very close to zero for both men and women, which is exactly
what we see in this figure.
Table 1.3 shows the averages for some of the variables used to construct per-
manent income predictions for spouses in the data set. Comparing columns one
7Some respondents fail to report information on variables for their spouses covering the past
calender year (income, weeks worked, weeks unemployed), so in those cases the second year of
marriage is used as the reference point: ∆ Perm. Inc. = log(Y Sppi,t)− log(Y Sppi,M+1).
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Table 1.3: Comparing Spouse-Respondent Populations by Sex (Means)
Males Females
Respondents Spouses Diff. Respondents Spouses Diff.
log(Income) 10.51 10.28 0.23*** 8.22 7.68 0.54***
Predicted Perm. Inc. 10.56 10.48 0.08** 8.69 8.43 0.26***
∆ Perm. Inc. 0.26 0.13 0.14*** -0.02 -0.13 0.11***
Employed 0.89 0.93 -0.05*** 0.69 0.67 0.02**
Unemployed 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00
West 0.17 0.15 0.03*** 0.15 0.17 -0.03***
South 0.29 0.32 -0.03*** 0.32 0.29 0.03***
Central 0.35 0.31 0.04*** 0.31 0.35 -0.04***
Black 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.08 -0.01
Hispanic 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.06 -0.01***
# of Children 1.30 1.30 0.00 1.30 1.30 0.00
Child ≤ 5yrs 0.52 0.51 0.01 0.51 0.52 -0.01
Pregnant 0.06 0.06 0.00
N (Person-Years) 9118 8549 8549 9118
and two, we see sample means of various explanatory variables for the population
of male respondents and the male spouses of the female respondents. In columns
three and four, we compare the populations of female respondents and the female
spouses of male respondents. For most of the control variables the population
of male spouses and respondents and the population of female spouses and re-
spondents the differences are quite small, though some are significantly different
from zero. In addition, the procedure described above generates predicted perma-
nent that are very close across the populations of respondents and spouses. We
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see some differences the mean of income shocks of spouses and respondents, but
overall the distribution of shocks are very similar.8
The analysis in WW posits that the divorce hazard is a quadratic function in
current predicted permanent income and controls for predicted permanent income
in the year of marriage. From the equations above, this would be equivalent to
for couple i, husband H, and wife W :
divi,t = β1,t ∗ log(Y pH,t) + β2,t ∗ log(Y pH,t)2 + β3,t ∗ log(Y pH,M ) + β4,t ∗ log(Y pW,t)
+β5,t ∗ log(Y pW,t)2 + β6,t ∗ log(Y pW,M ) + α′1,t ∗ xH,t + α′2,t ∗ xW,t + ui,t (1.4)
Where xH,t and xW,t are other control variables and ui,t is the error term. From
Equation 1.4, for a person with a particular value of log(Y pH,M) the estimated
coefficient βˆ1,t would describe the effect on divorce of a larger positive surprise
for a respondent compared to another respondent with a smaller surprise and
the same log(Y pH,M). In other words, comparing two individuals with the same
expectations at marriage, βˆ1,t is the effect on divorce for one of them having a
positive surprise. So, the specification compares changes in predictions for across
people who looked the same at the time of marriage.
Instead, the specification in Equation 1.5 uses the difference between the cur-
rent year and the time of marriage. The specifications used in this analysis include
8A histogram of the income shocks for these four groups can be found in the Appendix.
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the difference of predicted permanent income compared to the start of the mar-
riage. For example, for the husband’s: log(Y pH,t) − log(Y pH,M). In order to test
for potentially different effect for positive and negative surprises, this variable
is divided into its positive component,
[
log(Y pH,t)− log(Y pH,M )
]
∗ 1(Positive), and
the absolute value of its negative component
[
−(log(Y pH,t)− log(Y pH,M ))
]
∗1(Negative).
The estimated equation is:
divi,t = γ1,t ∗
[
log(Y pH,t)− log(Y pH,M )
]
∗ 1(Pos.) + γ2,t ∗
[
−(log(Y pH,t)− log(Y pH,M ))
]
∗ 1(Neg.)
+ γ3,t ∗
[
log(Y pW,t)− log(Y pW,M )
]
∗ 1(Pos.) + γ4,t ∗
[
−(log(Y pW,t)− log(Y pW,M ))
]
∗ 1(Neg.)
+ α′1,t ∗ xH,t + α′2,t ∗ xW,t + ui,t (1.5)
In some of the specifications the square of the difference is used, however it
is not significant. If we compare this to the linear term in Equation 1.4, β1,t
is essentially forced to be equal to −β3,t by construction. The estimated coeffi-
cient ˆγ1,t is the effect on the probability of divorce for a positive change of size
∆(Perm.Inc.) = log(Y pH,t)−log(Y pH,M) for a respondent. So rather than comparing
a movement in levels from a predicted value at marriage, the second specification
estimates the effect for the absolute change in predicted permanent at any level
of starting predicted permanent income. This is arguably the more intuitive way
to study the effect of income shocks on divorce, and perhaps similar to how the
couple themselves may think about surprises to their financial situation.
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Table 1.4: Effect on Divorce Probability-With Spouse Predictions
Model (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
W: Pos.∆Perm. Inc.t−1 -0.0005 -0.0014 -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0009 0.0010 0.0002
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
W: Neg.∆Perm. Inc.t−1 -0.0024 -0.0028 -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0021 -0.0023 -0.0012
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0017)
H: Pos.∆Perm. Inc.t−1 0.0044 0.0034 0.0005 0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0014
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0030)
H: Neg.∆Perm. Inc.t−1 0.0062∗∗∗ 0.0060∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗ 0.0040∗∗ 0.0036∗∗ 0.0037∗∗ 0.0027
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0020)
Wife’s*Husband’st−1 - - - - - -0.0093 -0.0101
- - - - - (0.0071) (0.0076)
Year Controls N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Demographic Controls N N Y Y Y Y Y
Duration/Age at Marr. N N N Y Y Y Y
Fertility Controls N N N N Y Y Y
Emp. Status N N N N N N Y
N (Person-Year) 20,243 20,243 17,745 17,744 17,744 17,744 16,373
Couples 2,789 2,789 2,299 2,299 2,299 2,299 2,257
R2 0.002 0.010 0.044 0.053 0.063 0.063 0.067
Custom weights constructed for the NLSY79 are used. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by person
ID. Marginal effects are reported. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Table 1.4 shows the results of probit regressions using the methods described
above to calculated the predicted permanent income of the spouses. The vari-
ables of interest are Pos. ∆Perm. Inc for each spouse, the positive change in
predicted permanent income, and Neg. ∆Perm. Inc for each spouse, the abso-
lute negative change in predicted permanent income. Each column adds in more
covariates to the regression. The first regression includes only the variables of
interest and shows a strong correlation between the divorce hazard and negative
income shocks for the husband. The regressions in Columns (6) and (7) add in
year fixed effects and various demographic controls. The effect of the negative
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realization of predicted permanent income remains significant and appear to in-
crease the probability of divorce. Column (8) includes controls for the duration
of the marriage and the age of the husband at marriage. In Column (9) is the
baseline regression9 used throughout the paper for robustness checks and alterna-
tive samples and I include controls for fertility such as the number of children and
if there are young children present in the household, however fertility decisions
may be endogenous with the decision to divorce. Column (10) also controls for
the wife’s change in permanent income times her husband’s, to see if there are
any differences in the divorce hazard when the shocks are moving in the same
or opposite direction. In addition, this variable captures information about the
size of total changes within the household, however it is not significant in this
specification. Finally, in Column (11) I include controls for the employment sta-
tus of the husband and wife which decreases the marginal effect, however these
are likely endogenous with the dependent variable as people adjust their labor
market behavior in anticipation of a divorce. Table 1.4 strongly suggests that
negative changes in predicted permanent income increase the probability of di-
vorce for men. The coefficient on the husband’s Neg. ∆Perm. Inc is positive in
all specifications, so larger (or more negative) changes will increase the probability
of divorce. As the previous literature has found, these baseline regressions suggest
9The full specification can be seen in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
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there is not a symmetric response in the decision to divorce when the wife has
a negative change in predicted permanent income. These variables are explored
further in Table 1.5.
Table 1.5: Effect on Divorce Probability: Direction of Changes
(12) (13)
Pos. Wife’s*Husband’st−1 -0.0471**
(0.0241)
Neg. Wife’s*Husband’st−1 -0.0297
(0.0229)
Pos. Wife,Pos. Husbandt−1 -0.0313
(0.0398)
Pos. Wife,Neg. Husbandt−1 -0.0419
(0.0361)
Neg. Wife,Pos. Husbandt−1 -0.0168
(0.0265)
Neg. Wife,Neg. Husbandt−1 -0.0537*
(0.0303)
W: Pos. ∆Perm. Inc.t−1 0.0031 0.0028
(0.0022) (0.0026)
W: Neg. ∆Perm. Inc.t−1 -0.0001 -0.0005
(0.0020) (0.0021)
H: Pos. ∆Perm. Inc.t−1 0.0031 0.0018
(0.0035) (0.0042)
H: Neg .∆Perm. Inc.t−1 0.0076*** 0.0085***
(0.0027) (0.0031)
Year Controls Y Y
N (Person-Year) 17,744 17,744
Couples 2,299 2,299
R2 0.062 0.064
Custom weights constructed for the NLSY79 are used. Standard errors are in
parentheses, clustered by person ID. Marginal effects are reported. *,**,***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Next, we explore the joint directions of the husband and wife’s changes in
predicted permanent income. The models in Table 1.5 further divide the variable
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Wife’s*Husband’s t−1 from the baseline regression. When the wife’s income shocks
times the husband’s is positive, it means that their surprises to permanent income
are in the same direction, and when it is negative, their surprises are in opposite
directions. First separating this variable into its positive and negative components
in Column (12), we see a negative and significant effect on the probability of
divorce when both spouses are experiencing a shock in the same direction. Column
(13) of Table 1.5 delves deeper to see what happens to the marriage in each of
four cases: both spouses face positive income shocks, the wife has a positive shock
while the husband has a negative shock, the wife has a negative shock while the
husband has a positive one, and both spouses face negative income shocks. Here
we observe that the results from (12) are due to periods when both spouses have
negative changes in their predicted permanent income. One explanation of this
is that it becomes too costly for a couple to divorce if both of them experience a
decrease in their expected future incomes.
1.4.3 Robustness Checks and Alternative Samples
Table 1.6 provides a few robustness checks for the results. This paper focuses
only on first marriages of the respondents, to avoid issues with higher order mar-
riages which tend to be shorter and more likely to end in divorce (Kreider and
Ellis (2011)). Unfortunately, the number of previous marriages of the spouses is
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Table 1.6: Effect on Divorce Probability: Alternative Samples
(14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Spouse No With Unemp. Marr. Lgth
Prev. Marr. Children Children Interact. Interact.
W: Pos. ∆Perm. Inc.t−1 0.0000 0.0014 0.0002 0.0004 0.0018
(0.0022) (0.0044) (0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0035)
W: Neg. ∆Perm. Inc.t−1 -0.0030 -0.0054 -0.0014 -0.0021* -0.0001
(0.0019) (0.0048) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0033)
H: Pos. ∆Perm. Inc.t−1 -0.0046 -0.0002 -0.0006 0.0007 0.0021
(0.0029) (0.0074) (0.0026) (0.0020) (0.0055)
H: Neg .∆Perm. Inc.t−1 0.0039** 0.0039 0.0032* -0.0001 0.0030
(0.0017) (0.0056) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0044)
Interacted with Becoming Unemployed
W: Neg. ∆Perm. Inc.t−1 0.0330***
(0.0097)
H: Neg .∆Perm. Inc.t−1 -0.0085
(0.0058)
Interacted with Marriage Duration
W: Pos. ∆Perm. Inc.t−1 -0.0002
(0.0005)
W: Neg. ∆Perm. Inc.t−1 -0.0003
(0.0004)
H: Pos. ∆Perm. Inc.t−1 -0.0004
(0.0006)
H: Neg .∆Perm. Inc.t−1 -0.0001
(0.0005)
Year Controls Y Y Y Y Y
N (Person-Year) 4,390 5,897 11,847 14,452 17,744
Couples 528 1,721 1,804 2,131 2,299
R2 0.147 0.072 0.075 0.074 0.063
Custom weights constructed for the NLSY79 are used. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by
person ID. Marginal effects are reported. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
only available for the years of 1982 and 1998-2010 in the NLSY79. The analysis in
Weiss and Willis (1997) does control for the spouse being previously married and
finds a weakly positive effect on the probability of divorce. For a robustness check,
the information on the number of previous marriages of the spouse is included,
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when available.10 In Column (14), negative changes in predicted permament in-
come of the husband still increase the risk of divorce, though the sample size is
much smaller.
In Bo¨heim and Ermisch (2001), the authors choose to only analyze couples
who have children, stating that families with children are of the most interest from
a policy perspective. In addition, we might expect that the types of couple that
have children versus couples that do not have children are different in a substantial
way. Finally, the literature often describes children as a type of marriage specific
capital. The results in Column (15) and (16) divide the sample into those couples
without and with children, respectively. There is no significant difference between
the estimated marginal effects of these groups but we only see a significant effect
at the 10% level for those with children. The magnitude of the marginal effect
for those with children is slightly smaller so perhaps negative income shocks are
still bad for marriage, but if the couple has children, the negative effect on the
stability of the marriage is dampened.
Unlike the income shocks studied in Charles and Stephens (2004), not all of the
negative shocks in this paper are due to unemployment. Instead, many of them are
10Or the number of previous marriages is assumed to be zero if the age at marriage 18 or
younger for women and 20 or younger for men as this group is very unlikely to have been
married before. According to estimates in Kreider and Ellis (2011) the median age at second
marriage for men is 35.8 and for women is 33.3 so this seems to be a reasonable assumption.
Among the respondents, for those that divorce, less than 10% divorce before the age of 22 and
less than 25% before the age of 25.
35
Chapter 1. The Effects of Unpredicted Changes in Income on the Probability of
Divorce
simply downward revisions of expectations compared to the expectations at the
time of marriage. Using employment status, however, we can attempt to identify
those negative shocks that are due to a switch into unemployment. Column (17)
interacts an indicator for switching into unemployment with the negative changes
in predicted permanent income for each spouse. While in general a negative
change for the wife did not affect the divorce hazard, the results here suggest that
if that negative change is due to unemployment, it does hurt the marriage. Note
that this does not include women who are out of the labor force due to pregnancy,
caring for children, etc. The negative changes in predicted permanent income are
not significant with the interaction terms included in the model.
In the last column of Table 1.6, I interact the duration of the marriage with
each of the four variables of interest to test if the effects are different depending on
how far along in the marriage the couple is. From this experiment, the direction
of the interaction terms suggests that any effect on the divorce hazard decreases
the longer a couple has been married, but is not significant for any of the four
main variables of interest.
We may also think that the effects of income shocks on divorce may be differ-
ent for different socioeconomic groups. Table 1.7 divides the sample by education
of the husband and family income of the household. For Columns (18) and (19),
low education indicates the husband has a high school degree or less completed
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Table 1.7: Effect on Divorce Probability: Socioeconomic Status
(18) (19) (20) (21)
H: Low H: High Low Fam. High Fam.
Educ Educ Income Income
W: Pos. ∆Perm. Inc.t−1 0.0003 0.0008 0.0005 0.0023
(0.0036) (0.0018) (0.0028) (0.0022)
W: Neg. ∆Perm. Inc.t−1 -0.0015 -0.0022 -0.0052 -0.0011
(0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0020)
H: Pos. ∆Perm. Inc.t−1 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0037 -0.0031
(0.0047) (0.0034) (0.0037) (0.0043)
H: Neg .∆Perm. Inc.t−1 0.0059* 0.0028 0.0039* 0.0035
(0.0035) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0026)
Year Controls Y Y Y Y
N (Person-Year) 8,039 9,705 8,496 8,496
Couples 1,137 1,286 1,144 1,049
R2 0.058 0.072 0.094 0.061
Custom weights constructed for the NLSY79 are used. Standard errors are in parenthe-
ses, clustered by person ID. Marginal effects are reported. *,**,*** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
education and high education indicates he has some college or more education.
Columns (20) and (21) in Table 1.7, divide the sample into two groups by age ad-
justed family income at the time of marriage.11 This measure of income is divided
at the sample median. We see a stronger and significant effect of negative income
shocks for the husband among both measures of lower socioeconomic status. One
explanation is that the negative income shocks of the husband are putting even
more strain on the relationship if the couple already has relatively low income in
their household.
11Since people marry at different ages, this gives us a standardized measure of income to
determine who is high and low income.
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1.4.4 Recipients of Surprises
Table 1.8: Couples Facing Income Shocks,
Compared to All Couples
All Shocks W: Pos. Shock H: Pos. Shock W: Neg. Shock H: Neg. Shock
Mean Mean Difference Mean Difference Mean Difference Mean Difference
Div. This Yr 0.032 0.032 0.000 0.031 -0.001 0.031 -0.001 0.035 0.003∗
Wife:
Black 0.087 0.087 0.000 0.098 0.012∗∗∗ 0.083 -0.004 0.053 -0.033∗∗∗
Hispanic 0.053 0.042 -0.012∗∗∗ 0.057 0.004 0.068 0.015∗∗∗ 0.045 -0.009∗∗∗
High School 0.394 0.397 0.003 0.428 0.035∗∗∗ 0.377 -0.016∗∗∗ 0.315 -0.078∗∗∗
Some College 0.367 0.340 -0.026∗∗∗ 0.348 -0.019∗∗∗ 0.399 0.033∗∗∗ 0.427 0.061∗∗∗
College 0.230 0.254 0.024∗∗∗ 0.218 -0.011∗∗ 0.212 -0.018∗∗∗ 0.241 0.011
log(Income) 7.954 9.349 1.394∗∗∗ 7.804 -0.151∗∗∗ 6.004 -1.950∗∗∗ 8.020 0.065
Age at Marr. 23.56 23.57 0.019 23.34 -0.219∗∗∗ 23.30 -0.255∗∗∗ 23.71 0.155∗∗∗
Age 30.17 30.69 0.513∗∗∗ 30.43 0.260∗∗∗ 30.41 0.231∗∗∗ 30.91 0.739∗∗∗
Unemployed 0.024 0.017 -0.007 0.021 -0.002 0.033 0.010∗∗∗ 0.024 0.001
Husband:
Black 0.086 0.086 0.000 0.097 0.012 0.081 -0.005 0.052 -0.034∗∗∗
Hispanic 0.052 0.048 -0.004 0.056 0.004 0.058 0.005 0.044 -0.009∗∗∗
High School 0.395 0.411 0.016∗∗ 0.422 0.027∗∗∗ 0.374 -0.021∗∗∗ 0.332 -0.063∗∗∗
Some College 0.294 0.290 -0.004 0.271 -0.024∗∗∗ 0.308 0.014∗∗ 0.334 0.040∗∗∗
College 0.288 0.284 -0.004 0.277 -0.011∗∗ 0.292 0.003 0.330 0.042∗∗∗
log(Income) 10.35 10.33 -0.016 10.53 0.188∗∗∗ 10.40 0.053∗∗ 10.00 -0.351∗∗∗
Age at Marr. 25.04 25.05 0.011 24.67 -0.367∗∗∗ 24.88 -0.160∗∗∗ 25.33 0.285∗∗∗
Age 31.66 32.19 0.529∗∗∗ 31.72 0.065 31.99 0.331∗∗∗ 32.57 0.907∗∗∗
Unemployed 0.020 0.017 -0.003∗ 0.017 -0.003∗∗ 0.021 0.001 0.026 0.006∗∗
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 1%,5%, and 10% level.
Who faces these income “surprises”? The empirical results show that there
are different effects on divorce for positive and negative surprises so it could be
expected that different types of couples experience them. Table 1.8 compares the
characteristics of all couples who have faced an unexpected change in predicted
permanent income to those in four sub-groups: where the wife has a positive
shock, the husband has a positive shock, the wife has a negative shock, and the
38
Chapter 1. The Effects of Unpredicted Changes in Income on the Probability of
Divorce
husband has a negative shock. Each of these groups is compared to all married
couples where an income shock for both the husband and the wife is observed. In
the second column, we compare couple where the wife has had a positive income
shock to all couples. These couples are less likely Hispanic, have less education
and the wife is less likely to be unemployed. Couples where the husband has had
a positive income shock are more likely to be black or Hispanic and the husband
is less likely to be unemployed, as seen in the third column. So it appears that
those relatively disadvantaged groups (blacks, Hispanics, low education) are who
experience positive surprise to their permanent income. One explanation is that
since these groups are not expected to have high earnings capacity, so are more
likely to have a positive surprise if they start earning more money.
Different patterns are seen for couples experiencing negative shocks. When
the wife faces a negative shock, as in the fourth column, we see these couples are
more likely white or Hispanic, have higher education, and the wife is far more
likely to be unemployed. Also in the fifth column, couple where the man faces
a negative income shock, which was most disruptive to a marriage, the couple is
more likely to be white, have higher education, and the husband is more likely
unemployed. Given these results, it appear that many of the negative income
shocks come through unemployed individuals, as expected. In addition, the groups
that experience these shocks are more likely white and highly educated, relatively
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advantaged groups. So perhaps the opposite is true here compared to those with
positive shocks: these are groups that are expected to do well in the labor market
so when they do not, it results in a negative revision to their expectations of
permanent income.
1.4.5 Testing the Validity of the Empirical Divorce Model
The divorce model used in this paper is different that that used in WW,
the most closely related paper in the literature as noted in Equation 1.4 and
Equation 1.5. The particular functional form chosen here was based on the natural
way of thinking about what might constitute a “surprise” for married couples and
how to model these surprises in a way that the couples themselves might think
of them. Thus, I chose measure an income shock as the difference between the
current year’s predicted permanent income minus the predicted permanent income
at marriage to obtain a measure of cumulative deviations over the course of the
marriage, separately by their direction. This functional form makes an assumption
about the relationship between predicted permanent income now and at marriage.
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Expanding the regression described in Equation 1.5:
divi,t = γ1,t ∗ log(Y pH,t) ∗ 1(Pos.)− γ1,t ∗ log(Y pH,M ) ∗ 1(Pos.) + γ2,t ∗ log(Y pH,t) ∗ 1(Neg.)
− γ2,t ∗ log(Y pH,M ) ∗ 1(Neg.) + γ3,t ∗ log(Y pW,t) ∗ 1(Pos.)− γ3,t ∗ log(Y pW,M ) ∗ 1(Pos.)
+ γ4,t ∗ log(Y pW,t) ∗ 1(Neg.)− γ4,t ∗ log(Y pW,M ) ∗ 1(Neg.)
+ α′1,t ∗ xH,t + α′2,t ∗ xW,t + ui,t (1.6)
and rearranging
divi,t = γ1,t ∗ log(Y pH,t) ∗ 1(Pos.) + γ2,t ∗ log(Y pH,t) ∗ 1(Neg.)−
(
γ1,t + γ2,t
) ∗ log(Y pH,M )
+ γ3,t ∗ log(Y pW,t) ∗ 1(Pos.) + γ4,t ∗ log(Y pW,t) ∗ 1(Neg.)−
(
γ3,t + γ4,t
) ∗ log(Y pW,M )
+ α′1,t ∗ xH,t + α′2,t ∗ xW,t + ui,t (1.7)
Now let the coefficients on log(Y pH,M) and log(Y
p
W,M) be designated as βH,t and
βW,t. Therefore, the implicit assumption of the divorce model is that the estimated
coefficients are such that γ1,t + γ2,t = βH,t for the husbands’ income shocks and
γ3,t+γ4,t = βW,t for the wives’ income shocks. Using a t-test to test this assumption
we have a χ2 value of 4.02 with a p-value of 0.05 for the husbands and a χ2 value
of 0.02 with a p-value of 0.89 for the wives. So we confirm the assumptions of the
model for women, but must reject it for men.
Thus, an alternative to this model is presented here to support the robustness
of the findings, rather than measuring an income shock as the difference between
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the current year’s predicted permanent income minus the predicted permanent
income at marriage. Instead, we consider that the relevant time horizon for couples
is not how different your predicted permanent income is from when you were first
married, but what we thought your permanent income would be five years ago.
One might think that couples are using a shorter time horizon as their frame of
reference rather than the entire length of the marriage. So the new equation for
∆ Perm. Inc.i,t is log(Y
p
i,t)− log(Y pi,t−5). Using this new measure of income shocks
a new regression is run following Equation 1.7 to again test for the validity of this
model. Using a t-test to test the above assumptions we have a χ2 value of 1.14
with a p-value of 0.29 for the husbands and a χ2 value of 0.44 with a p-value of
0.89 for the wives. So we confirm the assumptions of the model for both men and
women.
To confirm the results in Table 1.4 we now run the same set of regressions
using instead this change in predicted permanent income over the last five years, as
shown in Table 1.9. Again, each subsequent column adds in more control variables.
Across all specifications we continue to see strong evidence that negative changes
in the husband’s predicted permanent income destabilize marriage. The size of
the marginal effects using this methodology is over 50% larger. This provides
a robustness check since the model assumptions were rejected using the change
in predicted permanent income since the beginning of the marriage. In some
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Table 1.9: Effect on Divorce Probability: 5 year Time Horizon
Model (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
W: Pos.∆Perm. Inc.t−1 0.0014 0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0014 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0015
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
W: Neg.∆Perm. Inc.t−1 -0.0021 -0.0025 -0.0037∗ -0.0044∗∗ -0.0035∗ -0.0038∗∗ -0.0010
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0018)
H: Pos.∆Perm. Inc.t−1 0.0058∗ 0.0050 0.0035 0.0029 0.0024 0.0023 0.0019
(0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0032)
H: Neg.∆Perm. Inc.t−1 0.0087∗∗∗ 0.0087∗∗∗ 0.0056∗∗∗ 0.0055∗∗∗ 0.0051∗∗∗ 0.0049∗∗ 0.0047∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0022)
Wife’s*Husband’st−1 - - - - - -0.0018∗ -0.0020∗
- - - - - (0.0010) (0.0011)
Year Controls N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Demographic Controls N N Y Y Y Y Y
Duration/Age at Marr. N N N Y Y Y Y
Fertility Controls N N N N Y Y Y
Emp. Status N N N N N N Y
N (Person-Year) 20,310 20,310 16,808 16,808 16,808 16,808 15,482
Couples 3,086 3,086 2,432 2,432 2,432 2,432 2,386
R2 0.003 0.010 0.046 0.060 0.068 0.069 0.077
Custom weights constructed for the NLSY79 are used. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by
person ID. Marginal effects are reported. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
regressions we see a negative and significant estimate coefficient for the wife’s
negative income shock, however it is not consistent across specifications. One
possible explanation is that when the wife experiences a negative income shock,
she is less able to support herself if a divorce were to occur increasing the value
of the marriage.
1.5 Theory
From the empirical results of this paper, we see that shocks to permanent
income matter for the stability of the marriage. The likely channel that this
occurs through is changes to the marital surplus. There are several different types
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of models of marital formation and dissolution, each offering predictions as to
what the effects of changes in marital surplus might be. The goal of this section
is to discuss types of models with predictions that are consistent with the results
of this paper, and types of models that are not.
Consider models of learning where the agents have some uncertainty about
the value of permanent income for themselves and their spouses. Let Y pH,t and
Y pW,t be the husband’s and the wife’s predicted permanent income at time t. Since
the couple has married, we know that what ever their expectations of permanent
income were at the time of marriage, the match was acceptable at that point.
Denote these expectations at the time of marriage by Y pH,M and Y
p
W,M , where M is
the date of marriage. However, if there are changes in these expectations, which
change the marital surplus, the match might no longer be acceptable and the
couple will divorce.
1.5.1 Efficiency In Divorce
First, consider a simple model where predicted permanent income of the hus-
band and wife affect the marital surplus in a linear way.
SH,W = Y
p
H,t + Y
p
W,t (1.8)
Where SH,W is the total value of the marital surplus of husband H and wife W .
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In addition to increasing the marital surplus, permanent income also increases
and agent’s outside options. This could either be through the effect on the marital
surplus of potential future matches, or simply through value that is gained being
single. For simplicity, assume that it also affects the outside option in a linear
(but potentially different) way:
OH,W = (1 + α)Y
p
H,t + (1 + β)Y
p
W,t (1.9)
Where OH,W is the total value outside option of husband H and wife W , and α
and β are constants.
Suppose that divorce only occurs if it is efficient, that is when the value of
the outside option is greater than the marital surplus. If the couple is initially
indifferent between being married and not, then it is true that
SH,W = Y
p
H,t + Y
p
W,t = (1 + α)Y
p
H,t + (1 + β)Y
p
W,t = OH,W (1.10)
In this model, if there are changes to predicted permanent income, it will
change the value of both the outside options, and the value of the marital surplus.
But how it changes these will depend on the parameter values of α and β.
1. α > 0, β > 0
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If both α and β are positive, then increases in permanent income for either
the husband or the wife will increase the value outside of marriage more
than they increase the value inside of the marriage. So for these parameter
values positive income shocks would increase the probability of divorce.
2. α < 0, β < 0
In this case, positive income shocks may still increase the value of outside
options (depending on the size of α and β, but it will certainly increase the
marital surplus faster.) A model with these parameter values would suggest
that positive income shocks should stabilize marriage, as they increase the
value inside the marriage by more than the outside options.
3. α > 0, β < 0
With these parameter values, the model predicts different effects on the
probability of divorce for each spouse. For the husband, positive shocks
increase the outside options by more than they increase marital surplus. So
positive income shocks for the husband would increase the divorce hazard.
But for the wife, positive income shocks would decrease the divorce hazard.
4. α < 0, β > 0
46
Chapter 1. The Effects of Unpredicted Changes in Income on the Probability of
Divorce
Finally, the last case is where positive income shocks increase the outside
options more than marital surplus for the wife only. The model then predicts
that positive shocks for the wife would increase the probability of divorce,
while positive shocks for the husband would decrease the probability of
divorce.
Figure 1.4: Increases in Predicted Permanent Income
One important aspect of this model to note is that for any of these four pos-
sible cases, positive changes in predicted permanent income must have the same
effect on the divorce hazard, regardless of what the values are compared to some
reference point. For example, consider one reference point of predicted perma-
nent income at the time of marriage. This means that the model predicts that it
does not matter if an income shock is increasing predicted permanent income to a
point above the reference point, or if it is increasing predicted permanent income
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from a lower level towards the reference point. Panel a) in Figure 1.4 shows an
example where, from period 1 to period 2, the husband’s predicted permanent
income increases further above the value of predicted permanent income at the
time of marriage, Y pH,M . Panel b) instead shows an example where the husband’s
predicted permanent income is increasing from period 1 to period 2, but remains
below the level it was in the year of marriage. A model of this kind would suggest
that the effect on divorce must be the same for both of these types of changes.
This figure does not directly relate to the regression results, as this is comparing
changes from time t = 1 to t = 2. Instead, the regressions results would compare
∆YH,1 = Y
p
H,1−Y pH,M and ∆YH,2 = Y pH,2−Y pH,M . In panel a, both of these changes
are positive shocks that would stabilize marriage. On the other hand, both ∆YH,1
and ∆YH,2 in panel b would appear as negative shocks in the regression results
which increase the probability of divorce. But since larger negative shocks have
a larger impact on the probability of divorce, ∆YH,2 would increase the divorce
hazard by less than ∆YH,1.
1.5.2 Assortative Matching
Consider instead a simple model of strict assortative matching. Assume the
only factor affecting spouse quality is predicted permanent income, and there are
an equal and fixed number of men and women, N . There are distributions of
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permanent income for each sex of FH(.) and FW (.). Over time the values of Y
p
H,t
and Y pW,t change. By strict assortative matching, we mean that the man with the
largest predicted permanent income matches with the woman with the highest
predicted permanent income, Y¯ pH,t and Y¯
p
W,t. There is costless reshuﬄing in each
period, so as permanent income changes, new matches are immediately formed.
Suppose it is the case that as predicted permanent income changes the overall
distribution of permanent income for each sex stays the same. This means that if
a married couple does not have a change in Y pH,t and Y
p
W,t from one period to the
next, since the distribution stays the same, FH(Y
p
H,t) and FW (Y
p
W,t) are the same
as well. And, if each spouse’s position in the distribution for the sex is the same,
the couple will stay together. Put another way, if predicted permanent income has
not changed, other agents may be shuﬄing in position around the couple, but the
fraction of agents with permanent income higher than each spouse is the same.
On the other hand, this simple model has quite a stark prediction on what will
happen if either one of the spouses faces a shock to permanent income. For the
husband (wife), a change in either direction of Y pH,t (Y
p
W,t) would lead to divorce,
given that the distribution of permanent income remains the same. Of course,
this is quite a simple example of assortative matching, however similar patterns
would be seen in a more complex model with search frictions.
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1.5.3 Theoretical Implications
This is, of course, not an exhaustive discussion of the types of models of
divorce, and there was no discussion of how the marital surplus is divided within
the marriage. However, the results suggest that divorce occurs efficiently in the
data, and that positive income shocks raise the marital surplus more than they
raise the value outside of marriage. Many arguments could be made as to why
this is the case, such as the purchase of public goods in a marriage (washing
machines, a house, etc.). The only effect that is consistently observed in the
results is an increase in the divorce hazard from negative income shocks of the
husband. However, in at least some specifications we observe each of the other
type of shock (positive for the wife, positive for the husband, and negative for the
wife) increasing the divorce hazard as well. Though this does not strictly fit with
either of these simple models it does give some evidence for assortative matching,
where shocks in any direction change the outside options of the spouse, and if
large enough may lead to divorce.
1.6 Concluding Remarks and Future Work
Using data from the NLSY79, a long-lasting panel data set focused on respon-
dents born from 1957 to 1965, predictions of permanent income were constructed
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using the information known by respondents and their spouses in each year. Know-
ing the year the respondents were first married, we can then track changes in the
predicted permanent income over time, compared to what was expected of the
individual at the time of marriage. Compared to the literature, the data used is
a longer panel to more accurately obtain a measure of permanent income. The
analysis here also goes deeper into potential non-linearities in the effect on the
divorce hazard, by direction of the income shock, family structure, and socioeco-
nomic groups. The results show that what hurts a marriage is unexpected negative
changes in predicted permanent income for men. Conversely unexpected negative
changes in predicted permanent income only matter for women if they are caused
by switches into unemployment. In addition, we see it is those from lower income
and education groups whose marriages are most detrimentally affected by negative
income shocks.
One interpretation is that with lower permanent income of either the husband
or the wife, there is a smaller marital surplus. With smaller gains from marriage,
one spouse now may take a smaller share of the marital surplus in order to en-
courage their spouse to want to stay in the marriage. But if the negative shock to
income is large enough, the spouse may find it preferable to leave the marriage.
This analysis focused on only a slightly younger cohort than the one in Weiss
and Willis (1997), individuals who were aged 45 to 54 at the last year surveyed.
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An additional question yet to be answered is if these effects are constant across
cohorts. To answer this, another panel study would need to be used with younger
respondents. However, for now, the difficulty with focusing on a significantly
younger cohort, such as those in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth of
1997, is that the respondents have yet to enter their peak earnings years. This
means that constructing a measure of permanent income would be difficult and
perhaps inaccurate.
Examining those couples who experience positive income shocks shows that
they are more likely to be non-white and have lower education than the full
sample. It appears that those who have positive changes in their expectations
are from relatively disadvantaged groups, so perhaps had low expectations for
labor market success to start. Conversely, couple who face negative shocks are
more likely white and highly educated, groups that one would expect to do well
in the labor market. In addition, they are far more likely to be unemployed in the
year they experience the negative shock.
In the future, this analysis can potentially be extended to other character-
istics that may be important to one’s quality as a spouse such as fertility, and
health. Specifically, what happens when one of these characteristics change unex-
pectedly in a marriage? What is the effect on divorce if a couple has more or less
children than they expected, etc.? This paper has shown the importance of the
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initial expectations of an individual upon entering a marriage and that with large
divergences from the expectations, the probability of divorce will be affected.
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House Price Shocks and
Individual Divorce Risk in the
United States
2.1 Introduction
Do economic conditions affect marital stability? This question has seen re-
newed interest since the recession in 2007 both in the press and academia. Several
recent articles in The New York Times have suggested a connection between the
recession and the ability of a couple to afford a divorce: Leland (2008), Douthat
(2009), and Parker-Pope (2011). These articles speculate that during the housing
bust couples wanted to, but could not afford to, divorce. Others state that the
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recession and economic hardships have deepened couples commitments to each
other.
A large portion of the population will experience a divorce in their lifetime:
Kreider and Ellis (2011) estimates that 20% of all adults in the U.S. has ever
been divorced as of 2011. In addition, divorce is potentially very detrimental
for both the spouses and their children. Adults who have divorced have a lower
standard of living and less wealth compared to married adults and report higher
rates of depression (Amato (2000)). Children whose parents have divorced grow
up to have less education, lower earnings, and higher rates of teen pregnancies and
high school dropouts (Gruber (2004), McLanahan and Sandefur (1994)). Given
the prevalence of divorce and its harmful effects on individuals it is important to
understand the determinants of marital stability. This paper will explore the link
between changes in the economic opportunities of households and the decision to
divorce.
Changing economic conditions affect household wealth and other household
characteristics that in turn change the gains to marriage or ease with which a
couple can separate. This paper examines one component of household wealth:
owner-occupied housing. Specifically, how does a shock to housing prices affect the
divorce hazard for married couples? Housing has been the largest component of
household wealth for the past several decades, and about 33% of household wealth
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was held in residential housing as of 2007 (Wolff (2010)). In addition, house price
shocks are useful shocks to study as they are likely exogenous to any actions of
the individual households, as compared to other types of economic shocks such as
job loss.
This paper uses restricted household level data to analyze the effect of house
price shocks on the divorce hazard and links this to a quarterly house price index
by Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). In order to measure unexpected changes
in housing prices I take the residuals from a second order autoregressive process
of the house price index. The effect on the divorce hazard is identified using
variations over time across MSAs, controlling for local economic conditions. I
find that positive house price shocks decrease the divorce hazard, however there is
no significant effect of negative house price shocks. In particular for the average
couple, a one standard deviation increase in the positive house price shock reduces
the risk of divorce by about 13 to 18 percent. The results are strongest in the later
part of the sample, and for younger cohorts and households with lower income
and education. To my knowledge this is the first paper to examine the effect of
house price shocks on divorce using micro level data from the U.S.
The economic literature on divorce, beginning with Becker et al. (1977), em-
phasizes surprises, and in particular economic shocks, as a principal driver of
marital instability. In this seminal paper, Becker et. al. posit that it will only be
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surprises that matter for the decision to divorce as anything known to the couple
will have already been considered in the decision to marry in the first place. A few
papers have used longitudinal data to attempt to measure changes in expectations
of each spouse’s income such as Weiss and Willis (1997) and Bo¨heim and Ermisch
(2001). The literature generally find that only negative shocks to income increase
the divorce hazard, and positive shocks do not have a significant effect.
Also related is the recent literature regarding the link between business cycles
and divorce. Hellerstein and Morrill (2011) finds that an increase in the state-level
unemployment rate leads to a decrease in the number of divorces per thousand peo-
ple for the time period 1976-2009. Also using state-level vital statistics, Schaller
(2013) confirms these results on divorce and shows marriage rates also decline with
higher unemployment rates. Additionally, the author finds that these effects on
marriage and divorce rates are permanent, not just changes in timing. Chowdhury
(2011) measures the transitory component of income for households and finds that
divorce moves pro-cyclically with business cycles. In other words, when income
is low in a recession, the cost of divorce is too high so couples that might have
otherwise divorced stay together. Low income and minority groups in the Fragile
Families and Child Wellbeing Study are found to delay marital dissolution in bad
economic times, as measured by state-level mortgage delinquencies and local-level
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unemployment rates in Harknett and Schneider (2012). Other recent papers have
looked for a link between wealth shocks and fertility decisions.12
Most closely related to this paper are Rainer and Smith (2010) and Farn-
ham, Schmidt and Sevak (2011), two recent papers that attempt to determine
how house price shocks affect partnership dissolution. Contrary to my findings,
both papers find that it is only negative house price shocks that matter for mar-
ital stability, though the results show differing effects. The methodology used in
this paper most closely fits with Rainer and Smith (2010) (hereafter RS), which
analyzes respondents of the British Household Panel Survey. Using county level
housing prices mapped to local authority districts in the UK, the authors calcu-
late unanticipated house price shocks for households. Both legal marriages and
cohabitations are studied, and the analysis finds that negative house price shocks
increase the risk of partnership dissolution. Farnham et al. (2011) (hereafter FSS)
uses Metropolitan Statistical Area level house prices to examine the effect of unan-
ticipated changes on the stock of divorced people in the MSA. Using marital status
of respondents of the Current Population Survey, the authors find that the fraction
of divorced individuals decreases with negative house price shocks. This effect is
observed only within groups that are likely to be homeowners (those with higher
12Lovenheim and Mumford (2013) use house price data and restricted-use location data from
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), as in this paper. They find that increases in hous-
ing wealth increase fertility rates for homeowners. Dettling and Kearney (2014) also examines
the relationship between MSA level housing prices and MSA level fertility rates and also finds
an increase in fertility among homeowners.
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levels of education). The fraction of the population divorced is a combination of
individuals who are getting divorced, those who have not yet remarried, and the
net migration of divorced and non-divorced people. Thus the results in FSS have
a slightly different interpretation than those for individual households in RS and
this paper. To my knowledge, there are no papers that look at house price shocks
and divorce in the U.S. using micro level data and this paper attempts to fill this
gap.
2.2 Theoretical Discussion
2.2.1 Determinants of Divorce
In economic models of marriage and divorce, a couple will decide to marry if
the (expected) value of marriage is higher than the value of staying single. So,
the value of the marital surplus also determines whether or not a couple will stay
together. If the factors that affect the gains to marriage change, it could lead to
a match no longer being acceptable to the couple.
The following two period model of marriage and divorce follows closely to the
model presented in Peters (1986). In the first period, the couple must decide
whether or not to get married. Suppose that the joint value of marriage in period
1 for the husband, H, and wife, W , is M1. We assume that this value of marriage
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is a composite of a variety of factors of both spouses that together determine the
value of this couple being married in the following simple relationship: M1 =
MH,1 + MW,1. Each individual also has an outside option to the marriage: their
present value of staying single for the two periods, SH and SW , respectively. The
couple does not have perfect information about the value of marriage or staying
single in the second period. Instead, the true values are not realized until the
second period. We assume that both individuals know the expected value of
marriage in the second period, E (M2), and the expected value of their outside
options if they divorce in the second period, E (DH +DWdivorce), where DH is
the outside option of the husband and DW is the outside option of the wife in the
second period and M2 = MH,2 + MW,2. Also known before the decision to marry
is the discount factor, b, and the probability of divorce, p, which is a function of
M2, DH , and DW .
The couple must make the decision whether or not to marry in the first period
based on their expectations of the value of marriage. Let V be the expected
present value of marriage, given the information available in period 1:
V = M1 + b
[
E (M2) (1− p) + E
(
DH +DW |divorce
) ∗ p]
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where the value of marriage in the second period is the expected joint value
of the marriage in period 2 times the probability of staying married, plus the
expected joint value of becoming single times the probability of divorcing. Given
the information that is available in period 1, the couple decides to marry if the
expected value of marriage is at least as large as the sum of their present value of
staying single:
V ≥ SH + SW
In period 2, the true values of M2, DH , and DW are realized. If any of the
various factors that determine the value of marriage or of becoming single change
from what was expected, the couple may suddenly find it better to divorce in
the second period. For example, if housing prices are unexpectedly high in the
second period, this may affect both M2 and Di as discussed in the next section.
In a model of transferable utility, each spouse can transfer some of his/her value
of marriage to the other if it is beneficial. In this case, if that the joint value
of marriage in the second period is less than the joint value of being single (the
outside option), there is no arrangement they can make between themselves such
that they want to continue the marriage:
DH +DW > M2
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DH +DW > MH,2 +MW,2
If this is the case, it will be optimal for the couple to divorce. The next section
will discuss house price shocks in the context of changing gains to marriage.
Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) provide an excellent overview of what specific
factors can lead to divorce, and how these factors have changed over time. The
discussion about what influences marital dissolution can be divided into two cate-
gories: macrostructural factors (White (1990)) and individual or family character-
istics. By macrostructural we mean those factors that affect the cost of divorce for
the whole of society such as changes in laws, changes in social norms and stigma
surrounding divorce, and gender roles. Next, there are strong links between the
underlying forces of divorce and observables such as race/ethnicity, fertility, and
socioeconomic status. The data shows that couples who are older when they first
marry have a higher chance of reaching any particular length of marriage. This
is observed in SIPP data by Kreider and Ellis (2011) and is also true of respon-
dents in the PSID, and Rotz (2011) shows that the increase at the age of marriage
explains at least 60% of the decrease in the divorce rate since 1980. Another
aspect that may affect divorce has been the rise in cohabitation. Stevenson and
Wolfers (2007) report on data from various sources that show very little cohabita-
tion existed before 1970, and then growing at a fairly steady rate thereafter. One
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rationale for cohabitation is learning about match quality before making the de-
cision to marry. At the micro level there are a number of determinants of divorce.
These are changing characteristics that affect either the value of marriage or the
outside options of the individuals. For example, marriage or cohabitation takes
advantage of economies of scale and if the cost of these shared items changes,
the surplus of the marriage changes. To the extent that couples only receive a
noisy signal regarding the match quality, a couple may divorce if the realization
of the value of marriage is lower than expected. On the other hand, a divorce
may occur if the value of the marriage itself changes over time, even if the value
of marriage was perfectly observed at the start (Marinescu (2012)). The following
section discusses how house price shocks in particular may be a determinant of
marital stability.
2.2.2 House Price Shocks and Divorce
The definition of a “house price shock” in this paper is the portion of the
change in local housing prices that is unexpected. I chose to use these unexpected
changes in housing price for several reasons. First, if instead the analysis used
just the change in the house price index from one year to the next, this would
include both anticipated and unanticipated changes in housing prices. If some
portion of the change in housing prices is anticipated, it is unclear when we would
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expect a household to respond to an anticipated change in wealth. On the other
hand, using only the unexpected portion of the change in prices allows us to try
to identify a direct response to a change in wealth after it has occurred. The
second reason is drawn from the literature on the link between housing prices
and consumption/saving decisions of households. In much of the recent litera-
ture the focus has changed to housing price shocks, or windfall gains in housing
wealth. There has been conflicting empirical and theoretical findings on responses
to changes in housing prices, and it has been suggested that this is because some
changes in housing prices are anticipated by households. Stemming from the the-
oretical work of Skinner (1996), the research conducted by Disney et al. (2010),
Attanasio et al. (2011), and others demonstrate how a household’s consumption
decisions might respond to house price shocks. If a household were to experience a
rise in housing prices that they had expected, according to the standard life-cycle
model of consumption there should be no response since agents are forward look-
ing (ignoring the issue of credit constraints). That is, any expected increase in
housing prices has already been incorporated into the consumption/savings path
chosen by the households, ignoring any issues of credit constraints. If instead the
household faces a shock to housing prices that was unexpected, we might see a
change in their behavior.
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As discussed in the above model of marriage, a couple will marry (and stay
together) so long as the value of staying married is greater than the value of being
single. Unexpected changes in housing prices can affect the gains to marriage in
several ways and these effects are likely different for owners versus renters. To the
extent that housing prices and rent prices are correlated, an increase in housing
prices may be a negative wealth effect for renters. If however, they are not strongly
linked renters may not have any response to house price changes. Also, positive
house price shocks may mean it is more costly for a renter to purchase a home in
the future. It is certainly possible that even among homeowners households differ
in how they view a shock to housing prices. For some homeowners, an increase
in housing prices may be bad news if they intend to purchase a larger home in
the future. Or, an increase in prices may be viewed negatively by a retired couple
hoping their children will be able to purchase a home in the same area. In this case,
even though an increase in housing prices means their own home value increases
it also means it will be more expensive to buy new or larger homes. Two main
channels through which house price shocks may affect marital stability discussed
here: gains of marriage and changes in transaction costs surrounding divorce.
The sociology and psychology literature has extensive research on the positive
correlation of a household’s financial situation and marital satisfaction as seen in
Cutright (1971) and Conger et al. (1990). Increases in income or a better financial
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position is hypothesized to affect satisfaction in two ways: through the allowed
increases in consumption and through the increased “constraints” to marital dis-
solution. By which we mean that a couple that has increased their income has
more to lose in terms of its higher consumption/asset accumulation standing if a
divorce were to occur. An increase in housing prices for homeowners is an increase
in their wealth which may decrease their financial stress. This decreased stress
would increase the value of marriage, which in turn decreases the probability of
divorce. In the context of the marriage model, this would lead to an increase in
M2.
One of the gains to marriage in the theoretical literature is that of economies
of scale within households. In short, there many consumption goods that must be
purchased for each household, including the housing itself, dishwashers, washing
machine, etc. These items are those that all members of the household can use,
and so living together has its advantages. Renters will save on rent, owners must
only purchase one home, and purchasing one dishwasher is better than needing
to purchase two. Thus, living together to benefit from these economies of scale
provides one reason for cohabiting and/or marrying. For homeowners, an increase
in the value of residential housing increases these economies of scale and thus the
value to staying married. With higher housing costs, a couple would lose out
on these larger economies of scale if they were to divorce and live apart. Put
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differently, an increase in housing prices would increase the cost of living apart
since they couple would become buyers in the market. In the case of a shock
to housing prices, the couple will not have taken this change into account when
making their decision to marry, and thus it may affect their likelihood of staying
married. This would be equivalent to a decrease in DH or DW . To the extent that
increases in housing prices increases rents, this effect may be similar for owners
and renters.
Changes in housing prices also affect the equity that homeowners hold in their
houses. With a decrease in house prices, there is a decrease in the value of the
home, and therefore the equity held in the home. This may not matter to home-
owners who have paid off their homes, or who do not intend to sell the home
soon. However, during the 2007-2009 recession many homeowners ended up with
mortgages that were “under-water”, or they owed more on the mortgage than the
home was worth. For all homeowners, a decrease in the value of housing means
that it must be sold for less money but the amount owed on the home through the
mortgage stays constant. Through this channel, an unexpected decrease in hous-
ing prices can decrease the divorce hazard since the costs to divorce are higher, or
some couples might be “locked” in their homes. This would suggest that negative
house price shocks would decrease the divorce hazard.
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Another consideration for married couples is their prospects for buying or
selling a house. After a divorce occurs and the household’s assets must be divided,
and often the primary residence must be sold. Since housing is by far the largest
asset for most households, there may not be enough wealth in other assets for
one spouse to take over sole ownership of the home. In this data, 38% of heads
of household switch to renting in the year of divorce. When housing prices are
high, and the economy is experiencing a boom, there is an excess demand for
housing so it would be relatively easy for a couple to sell their house in the case of
a divorce (Case and Shiller (1989) and Genesove and Mayer (1997)). A housing
boom would make it easier to sell the home, and leave the couple with a larger
amount of money to buy separate residences. This suggests that positive house
price shocks would increase the divorce hazard by reducing the transaction costs
of divorce. In the context of the model of marriage, this would increase the values
of DH and DW . Conversely, in a housing bust, there tends to be an excess supply
of houses which would make it relatively difficult to sell the house upon divorce,
but cheaper to buy a new home.
So, the theoretical predictions suggest that the effect of house price shocks on
divorce could go in either direction. Increases in housing prices increase the gains
to marriage, which would suggest they decrease the divorce hazard. On the other
hand, it is easier to sell your home when prices increase which makes it easier to
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divorce. Given the theoretical direction of an effect on the probability of divorce
is potentially in either direction we explore the question with micro level data on
households.
2.3 Data and Methods
Two main data sets are linked in this paper to study the effect of house price
shocks on marital stability. The house price index used is the All-Transactions
Index for MSAs from the Federal Housing Finance Agency.13 This index combines
transactions from sales as well as appraisals. The All-Transactions Index provides
the best-suited house price index for the analysis in this paper as it covers a long
period of time and provides information for all currently defined MSAs.14 As of
2010, there were 374 MSAs defined by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget.
In addition, some of the largest of the metropolitan areas have been subdivided
into smaller divisions. This gives us a total of 384 MSAs and/or MSA Divisions
in the All-Transactions Index. The data contains a price index for some MSAs as
far back as 1975, and continues quarterly through the end of 2011. By 1987, the
index has data for 80% of the MSAs. The index is deflated using the Consumer
13Data obtained through the Office of Policy Analysis and Research in Washington, DC: FHFA
(2012)
14Other indexes exist, most notably the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indexes, however they
do not fit as well with the goals of this paper. The Case-Shiller index only covers 20 Metropolitan
Statistical Areas in the U.S., and does not begin until the late 1980s or early 1990s, and so there
would be too few observations to use for analysis.
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Price Index, CPI, excluding housing. This means that the index used will reflect
how housing prices have changed as compared to all other consumer goods.
As previously mentioned, I attempt to measure the unexpected portion of the
change in housing prices. To calculate these shocks, I approximate the quarterly
house price index with a second order autoregressive process with MSA and quar-
ter fixed effects is used in this paper, as described in Equation 2.11.15 Quarter
fixed effects are included since the index is not seasonally adjusted.
HPIi,t = β1 + β2 ∗HPIi,t-1 + β3 ∗HPIi,t-2 + γi + ηq + ui,t (2.11)
where i is the MSA, t is time, indexed by the year and quarter. HPI is the
quarterly house price index, deflated using the CPI, that is regressed on the index
for each MSA from the previous two quarters. γi is a fixed effect for the the MSA,
and ηq is a fixed effect for the quarter. The remaining variation in the residuals
from this first stage regression are taken to be the unanticipated change in prices.
At each point in time I use the cumulative sum of residuals from Equation 2.11
for the past four years, or past 16 quarters. This methodology ensures that for
each MSA in each year we can compare a cumulative sum of residuals that has
the same starting date. Thus, using the residuals from the previous regression,
15All of the analysis shown in the paper follow this methodology that is used in the rest of
the literature. Changing to a longer autoregressive processes does not change the results.
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the house price shock, Shocki,t is calculated as:
Shocki,t = uˆi,t + ˆui,t−1 + ...+ ˆui,t−16 (2.12)
where uˆi,t is the residual from Equation 2.11 for MSA i in time t.
16 By using
the residuals of the the AR(2) process, the house price shock variable attempts
to measure unexpected changes in local housing prices, rather than changes that
are anticipated. As the shock is calculated as the sum of the past four years of
residuals, the earliest date for the house price shock is 1979. The average start
date for the house price shock in the sample is 1988.17 Calculating the shock as
the sum of the past four years gives us a measure that can be easily compared
across locations since each MSA begins collecting housing data at a different time.
In order to assign the correct house price shock to each household, we exclude
those households who have lived in the MSA for less than four years, and so a
sum of the shocks from the past four years would not be relevant to them. In
comparison, the methodology used in RS gives a measure of the price shocks since
16The index is measured quarterly, so adding the residuals from the past 16 quarters to the
current quarter gives us the sum for 4 years. House price shocks of other lengths are tested in
Section 2.4.
17This is somewhat different to the calculation of house price shocks in RS and FSS. Both of
those papers use methodology presented in Disney et al. (2010) where the house price shocks are
calculated as the cumulative residuals of an AR(2) process of the house price index with county
fixed effects. Unlike the U.K. House Price data used by Disney et al. (2010) and Rainer and
Smith (2010), the All-Transactions Index starts at different dates for different MSAs. Therefore,
simply cumulating the residuals from Equation 2.11, as in RS, is not an ideal strategy since the
shock could not be accurately compared across MSAs.
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the start of the housing data. For households that have just moved from one MSA
to another, the entire past history might not be the relevant house price shock
that matters for decision-making.
The second main data set used is the PSID18, a household panel survey that
currently has data available annually from 1968-1997 and bi-annually from 1999-
2009. The panel began with a nationally representative sample of 4,802 families,
and has followed the initial sample and their children as they split off and formed
new households. As of the latest release in 2009, there were 8,690 households
being interviewed. The analysis is completed using the original households and
their split-offs. In addition, the restricted Geocode Match data from the PSID is
used to obtain finer location measures for the households. This data is then used
to match households to a house price shock by Metropolitan Statistical Area.
Finally, we link to the county unemployment rate, in order to observe the
effect of house price shocks on divorce independent of changes in local business
cycles.19 As expected, the county unemployment rate is negatively correlated with
the house price shocks. However, the coefficient of correlation between the two
series is relatively low at -0.27. Note that the sample in each model in Section 2.4
18Data obtained through the University of Michigan: PSID (2012).
19Unemployment data by MSA is only available beginning in 1990, so county unemployment
data was used. In many cases the MSA covers one county, however for some larger MSAs there
may be several counties included.
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begins in 1982, rather than in 1979 at the start of the housing price shocks, due
to the availability of the county unemployment rate data.
Table 2.10: Summary Statistics of Married
PSID Households, 1975-2009 Means
Estimation Sample All Homeowner Couples
Husband Wife Husband Wife
Demographics:
< High School 0.155 0.114 0.196 0.151
High School 0.295 0.426 0.320 0.438
Some College 0.211 0.204 0.185 0.191
College 0.338 0.256 0.299 0.221
White 0.875 0.875 0.896 0.894
Black 0.063 0.064 0.056 0.056
Hispanic 0.051 0.053 0.040 0.045
Year of Birth 1943 1945 1941 1944
Number of Children 0.821 0.821 0.882 0.882
Marriage:
Age First Married 23.62 21.65 23.25 21.32
Year First Married 1967 1967 1965 1965
# of Marriages 1.198 1.183 1.243 1.181
Length of Curr. Marriage 26.42 26.42 24.30 24.30
Frac. Divorcing this Yr 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012
Employment:
Employed 0.738 0.576 0.748 0.561
Unemployed 0.015 0.012 0.016 0.013
Labor Income $57,331 $21,670 $50,815 $18,591
Housing:
House Value $210,320 $210,320 $179,555 $179,555
Remaining Principal $69,448 $69,448 $59,997 $59,997
House Price Shock 0.111 0.111 0.102 0.102
County Unemployment Rate 0.059 0.059 0.062 0.062
Couples 3,893 3,893 9,675 9,675
N (Couple-years) 30,013 30,013 64,190 64,190
NOTE: Monetary variables are in 2009 dollars. The house values are self-reported yearly
measures of the value of the current residence for homeowners. Estimation sample begins in
1982 when county unemployment data is available. Sample weights are used.
Table 2.10 explores summary statistics for the two different married home-
owner groups in the data: married households who are in the baseline estimation
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sample in Section 2.4 and have a valid house price shock and all married home-
owners, including those who are not in the estimation sample. The ’House Price
Shock’ variable listed in the table is calculated as mentioned in Equation 2.11.
These two groups of couples are compared to see if there are any major differences
between the estimation sample and the entire population of married home-owners.
The couples who are not in the estimation sample either do not have a measured
house price shock, or have missing data for another explanatory variable. There
are several reasons why a couple might not have a house price shock matched to
them: the couple does not live in an MSA, they do not live in an MSA during the
period that the MSA has housing data available, or they do not have a location
reported with in the PSID Geocode Match Data. This means that for those cou-
ples who do have observations in the Geocode Match data but have no house price
shock, they live in towns of less than 50,000 people and/or rural areas, or they live
in an MSA with fewer than four years worth of housing data. So differences in the
means are mostly explained by the fact that the estimation sample is from urban
areas or large towns, whereas the rest of the sample is from more rural areas.
Both men and women in marriages in the estimation sample have more educa-
tion compared to the whole sample, and are more likely to be white. In addition,
both the husbands and the wives earn more income than those in the whole sam-
ple. The average current duration for married couples is 26 years for couples in
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the sample and 19 for couples who are not in the sample. Those couples included
in the sample have fewer children and are slight more likely to be divorcing in a
given year. The baseline estimation sample is limited to couples who own a home
and they live in more expensive homes compare to the entire sample of couples
who are homeowners. These couples also have more principal remaining on their
mortgages, which is unsurprising since their homes are more valuable. Looking
at the number of couples in each category, we see that a significant number of
couples are excluded from the sample mostly because there is no housing data
for them. Some of these couples are addressed further in Section 2.4.1, using a
different house price index.
One potential complication to note is that from the beginning of the PSID
data in 1968, until around 1985, there were important changes occurring in the
legal environment surrounding divorce. During the 1970s, the majority of states
changed these requirements to allow for “no-fault” divorce.20 Allowing for no-
fault, unilateral divorce increases the ease with which a couple can end their
marriage (Gruber (2004)). This may lead to differences in the likelihood of divorce
by state over time as each state switches to the new divorce law regime. This not
much of a concern here since the earliest date of the analysis is 1982, for virtually
20Freed (1972), Freed and Henry H. Foster (1979), Jacob (1988), and Marvell (1989) contain
information about when each state introduced some legal method for obtaining a divorce through
no-fault to either spouse.
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every observation in the regressions the state in question has already converted to
no-fault terms of divorce. In addition, all of the specifications of the divorce model
have year fixed effects to take out any other unobserved year-specific differences
in the propensity to divorce.
2.3.1 Description of House Price Shocks
Figure 2.5: Yearly Mean of House Price Shock of Respondents
Figure 2.5 presents the yearly means of the house price shocks that the house-
holds of the PSID face. This is constructed using the house price shocks calculated
in Equation 2.12 and combining them with the data on the PSID households based
on the CBSA code of each metropolitan area (or FIPS State/County code for the
largest metropolitan areas). The figure illustrates that on average households had
positive house price shocks during the late 1990s and early 2000s, and on average
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negative house price shocks during 2007-2009. The weighted mean of the shock
for all respondents is 2.59, with a standard deviation of 27.95. This is very close
to the mean and standard deviation of the estimation sample. The size of the
house price shocks range from -109 to 147. It should also be noted that this figure
represents averages for all metropolitan areas, so although on average the house
price shock variable is positive in the 1990s and 2000s, there was much variation
across locations.
Table 2.11: House Price Shock by State: 1995 and 2005
State Shock in 1995 Shock in 2005 Difference
Smallest:
Indiana 6.49 2.17 -4.32
Ohio 7.10 4.29 -2.81
Iowa 7.07 6.72 -0.35
Colorado 12.99 14.17 1.18
Nebraska 7.42 9.62 2.20
Kentucky 5.42 8.29 2.86
Michigan 4.11 7.57 3.46
Largest:
Massachusetts -32.42 46.84 79.26
New Hampshire -37.27 44.83 82.10
Maryland -16.90 68.18 85.07
Arizona -1.47 92.96 94.42
Nevada 2.97 100.68 97.71
New Jersey -26.48 74.19 100.67
Rhode Island -29.92 73.24 103.16
Florida -9.61 110.82 120.43
Washington D.C. -24.51 100.10 124.60
California -28.31 114.30 142.61
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To see this is true, Table 2.11 shows the average value of the house price shock
in different states in 1995 (the beginning of the housing boom) and 2005 (the peak
of the housing boom). The last column shows the overall change in the house price
shock during this time. The table illustrates that there were very large differences
across states during this time period of rising house prices. The first few rows
show the values for the states with the smallest change in house price shocks from
1995 to 2005. A few states even had prices falling unexpectedly or perhaps not
rising as quickly as expected. If we compare these to the states that had the
largest change in house price shocks during the housing boom we notice two facts.
First, many but not all of the states with the largest shocks had large negative
house price shocks at the start of the boom. Second, all of these states had much
larger positive house price shocks in 2005, as compared to the small shock states.
It is encouraging that the states that have been identified as having large shocks
during the housing boom, Arizona, Florida, California, etc., are indeed the places
that anecdotally we know had extreme increases in prices.
To further describe the distribution of the house price shocks, the next fig-
ure shows how the distribution of the house price shock has changed over time.
Figure 2.6 divides the sample into three time periods: pre-housing boom (1979-
1994), during the housing boom (1995-2005), and during the housing bust (2007
and 2009). The house price shock is measured in index units, and the width of
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Figure 2.6: Histogram of House Price Shock over Time
each bin on the histograms is five index points. The figure shows that compared
to the other two time periods, the distribution was much more concentrated dur-
ing 1995 to 2005. The earliest time period had negative house price shocks on
average, and the middle time period had positive house price shocks on average
with a relatively large number of observations in the right tail of the distribution.
The latest time period does not have a very smooth distribution, likely because
it is only for two years and so has far fewer observations included than the other
two sample periods. We can see that there were still many positive house price
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shocks calculated during the recession years of 2007-2009, which is a feature of
the large positive shocks observed in the four years prior to these.
The next four figures provide a visualization of the house price shocks for a
select few years. The figures show the house price shock data overlaid on a map
of MSAs using ArcGIS software.21 The color gradient shows house price shocks
of different sizes from -160 to +160. Thus MSAs that are more red to orange in
color experienced negative house price shocks in the given year, and MSAs that
are more green to yellow in color experienced positive house price shocks in the
given year. Note that the shocks switch from negative between the fourth and fifth
color category. As described above, there are only some of the MSAs that were
collecting housing data early enough to appear in Figure 2.7. Figure 2.8 shows the
house price shocks roughly at the start of the housing boom, where many places
had experienced negative shocks. Moving to Figure 2.9, many more MSAs are
appearing in yellow-green as many locations were experiencing positive shocks. A
few places to note in bright green that had very large shocks are several MSAs
in California, Nevada, Arizona, Washington D.C., and Florida as illustrated by
21Note that in the analysis some larger population MSAs are divided into subregions for finer
location measures. However, the GIS maps of metropolitan areas groups all of these subregions
one area, so the house price shocks shown on the maps are the average for the year for the
larger areas. The MSAs that are sub-divided in this way in the analysis are Boston, Chicago,
Dallas/Ft. Worth, Detroit, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Seattle,
and Washington, D.C.
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Table 2.11. Once we get to 2009, we observe several places begin to experience
housing “busts”, the locations appearing in red in Figure 2.10.
Figure 2.7: Map of House Price Shocks: 1981
Figure 2.8: Map of House Price Shocks: 1995
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Figure 2.9: Map of House Price Shocks: 2005
Figure 2.10: Map of House Price Shocks: 2009
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2.4 Results
Discrete time duration analysis is used to analyze the effect of house price
shocks on the probability of divorce. The interpretation of the results of a duration
model would be how house price shocks affect the instantaneous probability of
divorce for the couple, conditional on the couple having stayed together for this
long. These types of models control for the length of time the couple has survived,
as we know that the likelihood of divorce occurring changes with the current
length of the marriage. The date of divorce is set as the date of separation. In
the PSID, the reported separation date is the date at which the couple stopped
living together and so it is a good measure of the end of the relationship. The
legal process of divorce can often take a long time and so if the couple does not
report a separation date, we use one year prior to the date of divorce as a proxy
for the date of separation. This method allows us to most accurately capture the
true end date of the relationship. As noted in Kreider and Ellis (2011), using data
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, the median length of time
between a separation and divorce is one year. The shock variable is scaled by
dividing by the standard deviation of the variable. Therefore, the interpretation
of the coefficients in the regressions is for a one standard deviation change in the
variable.
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The divorce model used in the regressions is similar to the specification in RS,
Bo¨heim and Ermisch (2001), and Weiss and Willis (1997). I estimate the effects
of house price shocks while controlling for various observable factors about the
couples that may affect the divorce hazard. This includes things that would change
the gains to marriage, the value of being single, and the direct or indirect costs of
divorce. The model includes demographic controls, such as race, education, and
age at marriage, as the baseline divorce hazard may vary across these dimensions.
Year fixed effects are included in the regression as there may be legal or social
factors that affect the divorce hazards differently across the years of the sample.
In addition, the PSID was a nationally representative sample of households in
1968, so the respondents come from very different birth cohorts. To address this,
each of the regressions include dummy variables for birth cohort groups. Finally,
the county unemployment rate for each year is included to isolate the effects of
house price shocks on the divorce from local area business cycles.
A probit model is used for analysis, controlling for the current duration of
the marriage. Given that a household is observed many times in the data, the
interpretation of the marginal effects from a probit regression is the effect on the
probability of divorce in the current year, conditional on the marriage having
reached the current duration. Jenkins (1995) shows that by including controls
for the elapsed duration of the marriage, as well as other controls at time t − 1,
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then the maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters from a probit analysis
are consistent.22 Thus, a probit model in this form provides a framework for
discrete time duration analysis. To control for the length of the marriage, the log
of the current duration of the marriage is included in the divorce regression. This
choice of the log of the marriage duration specifies a particular parametric form
for the baseline hazard. We see that the baseline probability of divorce in the
data is decreasing at a decreasing rate over time, thus the choice of the log of the
duration of the marriage.
Since positive and negative shocks to house prices may have different effects on
the divorce hazard, the variable Shocki,t−1 is divided into its positive and negative
components. The variables of interest reported in Table 2.12 are “Positive House
Price Shock” and “Negative House Price Shock”, which are equal to zero when a
shock of the opposite sign occurs. To make the negative shock coefficients easier
to interpret, the absolute value of the shock is used. The results in Table 2.12
are for those couples who are homeowners, and allows for respondents who have
multiple marriages in the sample. In each probit model, the marginal effects are
22Ideally we want the value of each variable at the date of divorce. A divorce occurs between
the previous and current interview so the closest date, without going past the divorce, is the
date of the previous interview. Thus, the analysis does not include information that occurred
AFTER the date of divorce.
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reported for the explanatory variables. The divorce regression to be estimated is:
divi,t = α0 + α1 ∗ Pos. House Price Shockt−1 + α2 ∗ Neg. House Price Shockt−1
+ β′1 ∗Xi,t−1 + β′2 ∗ Zi + γt + ui,t
where divi,t is 0 while married and 1 at the date of separation;
Pos. House Price Shock t−1 and Neg. House Price Shock t−1 are the calculated
positive and negative house price shocks; Xi,t−1 are a set of time-varying controls
such as education, marriage duration, and the county unemployment rate; Zi are
time-invariant controls such as race, age at marriage, birth cohort, and number of
previous marriages; and γt are year fixed effects. The shock from Equation 2.12
is quarterly and the household respondents are surveyed annually. Because of
this, the quarterly shocks are averaged across each year to obtain the variables
of interest in the regressions. Although this takes away some of the variation in
the variable, it seems unlikely that a large house price shock that occurs in one
quarter only would affect a marriage, instead it is likely persistent shocks that
matter.
Each column in Table 2.12 represents a different regression model, sequentially
adding in more and more explanatory variables. I find that positive shocks are
statistically significant at the 5% in each column of Table 2.12, except for Column
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Table 2.12: Probit Model of Divorce Hazard:Homeowners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff.
(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
Pos. House Price Shockt−1 -0.0013 -0.0034*** -0.0014** -0.0014** -0.0014**
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Neg. House Price Shockt−1 -0.0032* -0.0014 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Year Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Ctrls No No Yes Yes Yes
Fertility Ctrls No No No Yes Yes
Income Ctrls No No No No Yes
# of Couples 4,243 4,243 3,894 3,894 3,893
N (couple-years) 32,091 32,091 30,016 30,016 29,960
Pseudo-R2 0.0018 0.0188 0.1138 0.1152 0.1150
Sample weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by person ID to account for each individual being
present multiple times. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
(1) which contains only the variables of interest and the county unemployment
rate.23 In each of the models, there is a negative sign on the positive house price
shock variable which indicates that larger, positive house price shocks stabilize
marriage. The standard errors are clustered by household, however the results are
also robust to two-way clustering on household and MSA since the house price
shocks only vary at the MSA level. In most models, the sign on the marginal
effects suggest that negative house price shock also stabilize marriage but it is
only significant at the 10% level with no other controls.
Column (2) shows regression results for a divorce model with only the house
price shock variables, county unemployment rate, and year fixed effects. Including
23Positive house price shocks also have a significant and negative effect using a logit model or
a linear probability model.
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demographic control variables such as age, birth cohort, education, and race in
Column (3) reduces the size of the marginal effect compared to Column (2) to
-0.0014, however it is still significant at the 5% level. Next in Column (4), I add
fertility controls for the age of the youngest child and number of children in the
household. The specification in Column (4) is used as the baseline specification
for later tables, when other regressors are not specified. This baseline estimation
sample has 30,016 couple-year observations, for 3,894 couples. This covers 309
divorces experienced by the couples. The average number of times a couple is
observed in the estimation sample is eight times, with a maximum of 22 times.
Column (5) adds measures of income for the husband and wife. We might think
that the county unemployment rate does not sufficiently control for the changes in
the economic environment which are correlated with housing price shocks. Con-
trolling for the income of the spouses does not change the estimated marginal
effects. Given that income is likely endogenous with the decision to divorce, it
is not included in the baseline regressions. The full specification for the probit
model is shown in Table B.1 in the Appendix.
I find a marginal effect of -0.0014 in the baseline regression of Column (4) in
Table 2.12 which means that for a one S.D. increase in the house price shock, the
divorce hazard is decreased by 0.14 percentage points. The average value for the
dependent variable, representing the fraction of the sample that is divorcing in a
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given year, is 0.0105 or 1.05%. This is a 13.3% decrease in the divorce hazard at
the means of all variables.24 In 1995 near the start of the housing price boom the
average house price shock was 5.5 and in 2005 near the peak of the housing prices
average house price shock was 43.9 for a change in the positive house price shock of
about 38.4 index units. The standard deviation of the house price shock variable
is 26.6 so this was a 1.44 standard deviation increase in housing prices. This would
suggest that the housing boom of the late 1990s and early 2000s decreased the
divorce hazard for the average couple by 19.2%.
Table 2.13: Length of House Price Shocks: Probit Models
(6) (7) (8) (9)
Shock Sum of Shock Sum of Shock Sum of Shock Sum of
Past 1 Year Past 2 Years Past 3 Years Past 6 Years
Variable Marg. Effect Marg. Effect Marg. Effect Marg. Effect
(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
Pos. House Price Shockt−1 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0012 -0.0035***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0012)
Neg. House Price Shockt−1 -0.0005 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0025
(0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0020)
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of couples 4,490 4,354 4,008 3,488
N (couple-years) 36,225 34,578 31,910 27,089
Pseudo-R2 0.1062 0.1135 0.1160 0.1219
Sample weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by person ID to account for each individual being
present multiple times. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
24This is comparable in magnitude to the effect of a 1 S.D. negative income shock which
decreases the divorce hazard by about 15% as estimated from my previous work in Milosch
(2012). The effect on the divorce hazard of 13.3% is much larger than what RS found, but
smaller than the effect of job loss as studied by Charles and Stephens (2004).
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Table 2.13 shows the long-lasting effects of unexpected changes in housing
prices by modifying the way house price shocks are calculated compared to the
previous table. Recall from Equation 2.12, that the house price shock is the
sum of residuals from Equation 2.11 for the past four years. Table 2.13 explores
sums of other lengths for the shocks. Looking at the one-year sum and two-year
sum in Columns (6) and (7) we see the same sign as the baseline regression,
though not significant. In Columns (8) and (9) use measures for the house price
shocks by taking the sum of residuals from Equation 2.11 for three and six years
respectively. In Column (8) the marginal effect is about the same magnitude as
the baseline results, though it’s p-value falls just short of significance at 0.107.
Column (9) exhibits an even larger and more significant effect than the baseline
at -0.0035.25 As before, in each of these regressions households who have moved
into the MSA in the past one, two, three, and six years respectively are excluded
from the analysis. This indicates that short-term fluctuations in housing prices,
even if they are unexpected, do not affect the divorce hazard. Instead, it is only
the longer lasting shocks to housing prices that affect this household decision.
I find that positive house price shocks stabilize marriage. Couples who have
positive house price shock essentially experience a positive wealth shock, but also
an increased cost to living apart. One interpretation of these results is that an
25The results look almost identical if we limit the sample to only the couples that would be
included in every one of the four models in Table 2.13.
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increase in housing prices increases the gains to marriage. A positive house price
shock means that it would be even more costly than before for a couple to main-
tain separate residences in the event of a divorce. This makes marriage a more
attractive option than before. Another possible explanation, as cited by the psy-
chology and sociology literature (i.e. Cutright (1971), Conger et al. (1990)), is
that the positive wealth shock decreases the financial stress in the relationship,
thus decreasing the risk of divorce. Much of the economic literature finds that
only negative financial shocks have a significant effect on divorce hazards. It may
be that this paper finds an effect from positive shocks since it covers the time
period of the U.S. housing boom where we saw large, positive shocks. Since the
data ends in 2009 the results are representative of only that time period, and
perhaps not of the years during the housing market crash.
Table 2.14 shows a few additional findings. First, Column (10) does not sepa-
rate the positive from the negative shocks, and the result from the previous tables
still holds: increases in the house price shock decrease the risk of divorce. In
Column (11), all couples are included in the analysis, regardless of whether they
rent or own. Column (12) looks exclusively at the couples who are renters. The
direction of the effect is the same for renters so unsurprisingly the marginal effect
for all couples is similar.
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Table 2.14: Combined Positive and Negative Shocks, All Couples, Renters
(10) (11) (12)
Owners All Couples Renters
Marg. Effect Marg. Effect Marg. Effect
Variable (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
House Price Shockt−1 -0.0009*
(0.0005)
Pos. House Price Shockt−1 -0.0017** -0.0026
(0.0007) (0.0026)
Neg. House Price Shockt−1 0.0000 0.0025
(0.0011) (0.0039)
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes
# of Couples 3,894 4,620 1,516
N (couple-years) 30,016 35,719 5,703
Pseudo-R2 0.1146 0.1251 0.1399
Sample weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by person ID to account for
each individual being present multiple times. *,**,*** indicate significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level.
The result that is consistent across all of these specifications is that positive
local area house price shocks reduce the divorce hazard. This is suggestive of
the scenario in Section 2.2 where homeowners face a sudden increase in cost of
living apart which in turn increases the costs of divorce or that the better financial
position of the household decreases stress in the marriage and makes divorce less
likely. The only evidence that negative house price shocks stabilize marriage, as
found by Farnham et al. (2011) is when year fixed effects are not included in the
regressions though the sign of the coefficient in most models is consistent with
their findings.
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2.4.1 Who is Affected By House Price Shocks?
Table 2.15: Alternative Samples-Probit Models
(13) (14) (15) (16)
Younger Older 1982-1994 1995-2009
Cohort Cohort
Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff.
Variable (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
Pos. House Price Shockt−1 -0.0034* -0.0006 -0.0013 -0.0017*
(0.0020) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0016)
Neg. House Price Shockt−1 0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0008 0.0000
(0.0036) (0.0006) (0.0018) (0.0010)
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Couples 2,456 1,438 3,230 2,352
N (couple-years) 15,069 14,947 14,666 15,350
Pseudo-R2 0.0629 0.1339 0.1103 0.1404
Sample weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by person ID to account for each individual
being present multiple times. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
In this section we identify groups/time periods where the respondents are most
affected by the house price shocks. Column (13) of Table 2.15 restricts the sample
to the younger cohorts of heads of households in the PSID. Included are only
households where the head was born in 1949 or later. The sample size is smaller,
but as in the previous models positive house price shocks appear to stabilize
marriage. There is no significant effect of house price shocks on households from
the older birth cohort. Of course, this may not necessarily be indicative of no
effect for the older cohort, since there is considerable selection bias among the
older married couples. We do not observe the older birth cohort during their
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riskiest years of marriage and so are only seeing those stable matches that have
lasted until now. Next, we examine the beginning and ending periods of the data
separately, as there was much greater variation in the house price shocks across
MSAs later in the sample and different divorce rates across the country over time.
The results from Columns (15) and (16) show that the results are driven by the
time period with the greater volatility in house price shocks. In addition, since
the housing data used by RS is from 1991-2009, their paper only contains couples
in the BHPS during this time. The years in Column (16) are close to the years
used in RS, providing a check that there was not just something different about
the particular years used in their sample, rather than the full specification in
Table 2.12 of 1982-2009.
Table 2.16: By Education and Income Levels
(17) (18) (19) (20)
Husband: Husband: Some Low: Family High: Family
HS or less Coll. or more Income Income
Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff.
Variable (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
Pos. House Price Shockt−1 -0.0021** -0.0007 -0.0021** -0.0007
(0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008)
Neg. House Price Shockt−1 -0.0010 0.0007 0.0011 -0.0013
(0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0014)
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Couples 1,966 2,025 1,963 1,963
N (couple-years) 14,554 15,462 14,985 14,975
Pseudo-R2 0.1705 0.0980 0.1669 0.1062
Sample weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by person ID to account for each individual
being present multiple times. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
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Next the sample is divided by the education of the husband and the income
level of the family in Table 2.16. The table shows results for respondents with
education levels of high school or less and for some college or more. Comparing
these two samples we see that the house price shock appears to only affect those
respondents with lower education. A wealth shock like a house price shock might
affect couples with different levels of household income differently. The sample
is divided at the 50th percentile for age-adjusted family income at the time of
marriage. From the marginal effects reported in Columns (19) and (20), we see
that it is the lower income families that are affected by house price shocks. It may
be the case that a shock to housing wealth has more of an impact on low income
families if a greater fraction of their total wealth is held is housing.
Table 2.17 provides results for an attempt to include some respondents who
do not live in an MSA. The All-Transactions Index provides a house price index
only for those respondents who reside in a Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is
defined by the Office of Management and Budget as a geographical area with an
urban area of more than 50,000 people. So in the baseline specification households
located in areas with a population smaller than 50,000 are excluded. The FHFA
provides another quarterly house price index for non-metropolitan areas at the
state level beginning in 1995. The procedure from Section 2.3 is repeated for the
Non-Metropolitan Index with quarter and state fixed effects. This index is used
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Table 2.17: Including State Non-Metro. House Price Shocks: Homeowners
(21) (22)
Shock Sum of Shock Sum of
Past 4 Years Past 6 Years
Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff.
Variable (S.E.) (S.E.)
Pos. House Price Shockt−1 -0.0012* -0.0013**
(0.0007) (0.0007)
Neg. House Price Shockt−1 -0.0003 -0.0013
(0.0011) (0.0011)
Year Effects Yes Yes
# of couples 4,068 3,639
N (couple-years) 30,599 27,584
Log-Psuedolikelihood -1594.2 -1308.5
Psuedo-R2 0.1142 0.1200
Sample weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by person ID to account for each
individual being present multiple times. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level.
for households who are not located in an MSA but we know the state they live in.
Since this only varies at the state level, and house prices can be vastly different
across different areas of a state this is a much worse measure of house price shocks
that what is measured using the All-Transactions Index. The results of probit
models are presented in Column (21) and (22) for two different lengths of the
house price shock. The positive house price shocks are significant across all four
specifications. The size of the marginal effects is very close to what was found in
the baseline sample. This indicates that it is not something specific to couples
who live in larger towns and cities, but applies to those in more rural areas as
well.
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2.4.2 Robustness Checks
A few robustness checks were performed to test the validity of the results
presented above. First, an alternative type of duration analysis is performed
using the Cox Proportional Hazards Model (Cox (1972)). This second type of
model is used to check for consistency in the results found using a probit model.
The Proportional Hazards model allows the researcher to use partial likelihood to
estimate the coefficients of the model without specifying a particular functional
form for the baseline hazard function.26 As with the probit model, the analysis
with the Proportional Hazards model allows for the respondents to have multiple
marriage spells within the data. For each marriage at each point in time, the
Proportional Hazards model estimates the effect of the explanatory variables on
the divorce hazard. The results are presented in Table 2.18. For each of the
variables, a hazard ratio greater than one indicates that an increase in the variable
increases the divorce hazard, and a hazard ratio less than one indicates that an
increase in the variable decreases the divorce hazard. For the same reasons as
26Discrete time duration models and continuous time duration models both provide estimates
of the effect of the variables on the probability of divorce, but view the explanatory variables
in slightly different ways. Jenkins (1995) states that for discrete time duration analysis, if the
unit of time is a year, and the time-varying variables are measured at the end of each year, the
model makes the assumption that the variables are constant over the year. This seems to be
a reasonable assumption since most of the time-varying variables do not change very quickly
(education, number of children, etc.). Evidence has shown that in general the time aggregation
does not cause significant bias in the estimates for simple parametric approaches (Bergstro¨m
and Edin (1992)).
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noted with the probit models, all of the regressions using the Cox Proportional
Hazards Model include the time-varying variables measured at time t− 1.
Table 2.18: Cox Proportional Hazards Model of Divorce Hazard:Homeowners
(23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio
Variable (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
Pos. House Price Shockt−1 0.810** 0.779*** 0.820* 0.820* 0.821*
(0.069) (0.074) (0.087) (0.087) (0.086)
Neg. House Price Shockt−1 0.908 0.878 0.922 0.918 0.922
(0.135) (0.144) (0.175) (0.174) (0.175)
Year Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Ctrls No No Yes Yes Yes
Fertility Ctrls No No No Yes Yes
Income Ctrls No No No No Yes
# of Couples 4,623 4,623 4,224 4,224 3,899
N (couple-years) 32,531 32,531 30,397 30,397 30,017
Log-psuedolikelihood -2185.7 -2170.2 -1694.8 -1693.3 -1673.8
Average of sample weights for each marriage are used. Standard errors are clustered by person ID to account
for each individual being present multiple times. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
The direction of the effect for the positive house price shocks in Table 2.18 is
the same as in Table 2.12.27 The hazard ratio for the positive shocks is less than
one in all models, suggesting that larger positive shocks decrease the probability
of divorce for the couple. The effect is significant at the 10% level for all specifica-
tions. The hazard ratio for the models in Table 2.18 is around 0.821. This would
suggest that a one standard deviation larger positive house price shock would
27The difference in sample size between these regressions and those in Table 2.12 are partially
because of the few households that are only observed once in the sample. A household must
be observed at least twice to be included in a Cox Model. The other reason for the difference
is the few observations with a zero weight. A Cox Model must have a constant weight for the
duration of a marriage, so the average of the weight variable is used, which washes out a zero
for one year in the weight variable.
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decrease the divorce hazard of the couple by 17.9% (compared to an estimate of
13.3% from the baseline estimation). Again thinking about the housing boom of
the late 1990s to early 2000s, which had an average increase in house price shocks
of about 38.4 index units. This corresponds to a 1.44 standard deviation increase
in the house price shock. The results using the Cox Proportional Hazards model
suggest that the housing boom decreased the probability of divorce for married
couples by about 25.8% on average over the entire period.
Next, the estimation of the house price index as in Equation 2.11 includes
lags from housing prices in the two previous quarters. This was chosen as to
follow the methods used in the literature. However, the results hold if a longer
lag structure is chosen (i.e. lags from the past three or four quarters). In addition
to differences in the propensity to divorce across different years, there also may
be regional differences over time. Including region-year interactions, the marginal
effect on the positive house price shock is approximately the same at -0.0015
with a standard error of (0.0008) so the effect is significant at the 10% level. I
also checked the robustness of the results using other levels of aggregation of the
unemployment rate. The county unemployment rate begins in 1982, so a few years
of data is cut off from the analysis. The results are unchanged when including the
state unemployment rate, which covers the entire 1979-2009 time period of the
available house price shock data, though this is clearly a much cruder measure of
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local business cycles. I also check the results using the unemployment rate at the
MSA level, however these are only available from 1990 on. Though the sample size
is reduced, the size of the significant marginal effect on the positive house price
shock is about the same, though the standard error increases slightly to 0.0008
so it is now significant at the 10% level. The probability of divorce may also be
influenced by the employment status of the husband and wife, however these are
potentially endogenous variables if individuals change their labor market choices
in anticipation of divorce. Including employment status of each spouse in the
regressions does not change the results. To ensure that higher order marriages
are not driving the results, I restrict the estimation sample to only first marriages
of respondents. The marginal effect of the positive house price shock in that
regression is slightly smaller (-0.0011) but is still marginally significant at the
10% level.
As an additional check we also examine the effect of a change in the level
of the house price index. This would incorporate both the unexpected change
in housing prices (as analyzed above) as well as the expected change in housing
prices. Given that some portion of this variation may be expected by individuals,
it is unclear when households would respond to anticipated changes in housing
prices. I estimate regressions using the percent change in the All-Transactions
Index, adjusted for seasonality, rather than the house price shock variable. The
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percent change variables are not significant whether using the change from one
year to the next, or the change in prices over the past four years. The results are
unchanged if the MSA-specific variation is also removed from the index.
2.5 Concluding Remarks and Future Work
This paper has examined how wealth shocks affect marital stability. In par-
ticular, the paper asks how a wealth shock in the form of a house price shock
affects the divorce hazard of individual households. Using household level data
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and a MSA level house price index
from the Federal Finance and Housing Administration, a measure of house price
shocks are made for each household. Housing prices are approximated by a second
order autoregressive process with MSA and quarter fixed effects. The residuals
from the AR(2) process are cumulated for the past four years, and this cumula-
tive sum serves at a measure of the house price shock. This calculation of house
price shocks is an improvement over those previously used in the literature which
did not consider the moving behavior of households. Consistent across different
specifications is the result that positive house price shocks stabilize marriage. In
addition, this result is robust to different econometric models of duration anal-
ysis, including probit models and Cox Proportional Hazard Models. Although
the coefficient of negative house price shocks have the same sign as Farnham et
101
Chapter 2. House Price Shocks and Individual Divorce Risk in the United States
al. (2011), the result is not significant in any specification with the house price
shocks.
The role of housing shocks is explored further, by the birth cohort of the head
of household, education and income levels, and remaining mortgage debt. The
findings in this paper show that the couples that are affected are those with the
heads of households from the younger cohort in the PSID, though this may be
because those couples in the older cohort who were meant to divorce already have
by the time they are observed in the data. It is not surprising that the house price
shocks affect households with low education and low family income the most, as
they would have the most difficulty paying for two homes.
As expected, shocks to housing prices have an important effect on the stability
of marriage, since such shocks would affect the marital surplus, and the value of the
outside options. In this paper, I consider house price shocks faced by individual
households as it is likely that such shocks are exogenous to any of the unobserved
behaviors of the household. In addition, it is an ideal price shock to study as
housing is the largest component of wealth for most households in the United
states for the past few decades. Finally, by focusing on shocks to housing prices
we are identifying something that was not anticipated by households and therefore
is not something they may have already incorporated into their decision regarding
whether this marriage was suitable.
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The households in the PSID come from a wide range of birth cohorts, and
include many older couples that may not be a relevant sample of individuals po-
tentially affected by shocks to housing prices. Thus, this line of research would
benefit from examining other data sources with younger birth cohorts. Other
questions yet to be investigated are how house price shocks affect other house-
hold decisions. There has been some recent research on the effect of house price
changes on fertility, notably in Dettling and Kearney (2014) (using MSA level fer-
tility data) and Lovenheim and Mumford (2013) (using self-reported house prices).
Further examination of the topic is in order as self-reported housing prices is likely
endogenous with a couple’s fertility decisions. Another household decision that
a house price shock potentially may affect is the labor supply and labor partic-
ipation choices of households. These questions are to be explored in the next
chapter.
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3.1 Introduction
Economists have studied the effects of economic shocks on many different
decisions that individuals and households make, including labor supply choices.
Given the large changes in the economic environment we have seen since the 2007
recession, it is important for us to understand the broader impacts of these changes
on household behavior. In particular the large housing boom and subsequent
housing bust have had serious implications for the economic situation faced by
households. This paper contributes to the literature on labor supply choices by
estimating the effects of unexpected changes in housing prices on employment and
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hours worked. How do households adjust their labor supply choices in response
to positive versus negative house price shocks? How are these responses different
across men and women, and different types of households? The answers to these
questions will help us further understand the employment patterns and choices
observed in the economy as well as provide insight into the consequences of the
dramatic changes in the housing market in recent years.
House price shocks are an attractive type of price shock to study since a large
fraction of households in the United States own their own home. According to
Wolff (2010) housing wealth has been the largest component of household wealth
for several decades, and on average a household has 33% of their wealth in owner-
occupied housing. In addition, local house price shocks are likely exogenous to
many behaviors of individual households.
This paper examines the link between changes in housing prices and labor
supply of households. I combine a house price index from the Federal Housing
Finance Agency (FHFA) and data on individual households from the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID). Unexpected changes to housing prices are captured
using the residuals from a second-order autoregressive process. These residuals
are cumulated from the previous three years to generate a measure of long-lasting
changes in housing prices. The effects of these house price shocks on labor supply
choices are examined at both the extensive and intensive margin for men and
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women, and separately by marital status. I find that positive house price shocks
cause married women to decrease their total labor supply. The effect is significant
at the extensive margin, but not the intensive margin for women with positive
working hours. I also show that older married males, age 65 and over, increase
their total labor supply in response to a negative house price shock. This effect is
due to the older males being more likely to remain employed. Finally, I explore
particular demographic and economic groups that are most responsive to house
price shocks. The results show that it is the high income, high education women
with children who decrease their labor supply following a positive house price
shock. We see the strongest effect for women with young children, suggesting
that women are taking the opportunity of a positive wealth shock to stay home
and care for their children. To my knowledge this is the first paper to look at the
effects of house price shocks on labor supply for a broad sample of households in
the United States.
Several papers have examined the effect of changes in housing prices on the la-
bor supply choices of households, and specifically focused on those individuals who
are less attached to the labor force such older households, married women, and the
self-employed. Henley (2004) is closely related to the exercise in this paper, and
uses household level data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The
author measures changes in average county house prices in the United Kingdom
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as well as changes in wealth through windfall gains. The paper shows that men
increase their labor hours after a decrease in housing prices and women decrease
labor hours after an increase in housing prices. Unlike the analysis in this paper,
Henley uses changes in local housing prices which is a combination of expected
and unexpected changes. Farnham and Sevak (2007) find that households in the
U.S. retire earlier when facing positive changes in housing wealth using data from
the Health and Retirement Survey. Finally, married women’s labor supply choices
are studied in Fortin (1995). The author finds that women’s labor supply choices
are constrained by mortgage obligations and they would decrease labor hours with
lower mortgage debt. More recent work in Disney and Gathergood (2013) find ev-
idence across genders that increases in housing prices decrease labor supply with
the strongest results among the youngest and oldest respondents using data from
the BHPS.
Another group that may be less attached to the labor force are those who
are, or would like to become self-employed. The liquidity constraints facing self-
employed households is analyzed by Lindh and Ohlsson (1996) studies Swedish
Lottery winners and finds they are significantly more likely to become or stay
self-employed. Disney and Gathergood (2009) revisit this question by looking at
the entry into self-employment of households in the BHPS in response to shocks
to housing wealth. They show that house price shocks are a good predictor of
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starting a small business, however there is no evidence of this affecting the liquidity
constraints facing these households. Also using BHPS data, Taylor (2001) looks
at the household’s response to windfall gains and their role in relaxing these
liquidity constraints. He finds that a positive windfall gain increases the rate at
which individuals enter into self-employment, but this occurs at a decreasing rate.
Closely related to these studies are those that study labor supply responses to
other economic shocks. Households also decrease their labor force participation
rate in response to inheritances as found by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993). Although,
Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) finds that the labor supply response of households
to inheritances is small. Another type of wealth shock comes through unearned
income. Imbens et al. (2001) study lottery winners and find that they have de-
creased labor earnings coming through increased leisure, especially among those
closer to retirement age. Benito and Saleheen (2011) find that a deterioration in
one’s financial situation, compared to what was expected, leads to an increase in
labor supply. Using aggregated MSA-level data, Charles et al. (2013) finds that
the housing boom of 2000-2007 reduced non-employment among displaced man-
ufacturing workers thus masking the effect of the manufacturing decline during
that time period.
There has also been a growing literature on the effects of price or wealth shocks
on other household decisions such as fertility or consumption. Using different
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data sources, both Lovenheim and Mumford (2013) and Dettling and Kearney
(2014) find that increases in housing wealth of homeowners increases fertility rates.
Other household decisions studied in the literature include marital dissolution,
consumption and savings behavior of households, and household equity. Using
data from the Dutch Postcode Lottery, Kuhn et al. (2011) shows that lottery
winners do not vary their non-durable consumption by much, however they do
appear to adjust the timing of durable purchases following the a model of life-
cycle consumption smoothing. Browning et al. (2013) examines the link between
consumption and unanticipated house price changes using Danish panel data and
finds little evidence of housing wealth changes affecting consumption. The link to
consumption appears to be almost entirely through its role as collateral.
Similar papers have examined the effects of changes in levels of housing prices
on labor supply choices but compared to these closely related papers in the lit-
erature, this paper is the first to focus on unexpected changes in housing prices.
For reasons explored in Section 3.2, the use of unexpected price shocks is ideal
for looking for an effect on households’ decisions. Several of these studies have
explored the effect on labor supply for select groups (self-employed, retirees). In-
stead, this paper examines a wide range of household types in the United States.
The only other paper using a nationally representative survey of households is
Disney and Gathergood (2013) with data from the United Kingdom.
109
Chapter 3. House Price Shocks and Labor Supply Choices
3.2 Theoretical Discussion
Important to the current study is also a large literature on the intertemporal
substitution in labor supply with both theoretical and empirical evidence includ-
ing Heckman and MaCurdy (1980), Heckman (1993), and Altonji (1986). The
literature highlights the important distinction between anticipated and unantic-
ipated price changes. Consider a simple life cycle model where each agent only
lives for two periods and has utility over leisure and consumption in each period.
Then the agent wants to maximize lifetime utility subject to a wealth constraint.
For simplicity, I assume that utility is intertemporally separable. Consumption
in period one and two is denoted c1 and c2 and leisure in period one and two is
denoted `1 and `2. Let the rate of time preference for the agent equal the market
interest rate, r. The agent is endowed with some assets in period one, ω1 and
knows the probability distribution that assets in period two are drawn from. ω1
and ω2 are measure of the total value of all assets owned by the agent, including
housing prices. Although the agent does not know the true value of ω2 in period
one, he may later adjust his optimal choices upon seeing the realization of ω2 in
period two. Wages are taken to be exogenous at W1 and W2 for periods one and
two, respectively. The agent has one unit of time in each period to split between
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leisure and labor. Then the agent’s decision problem in period one is
max
c1,c2,`1,`2
U(c1, `1) +
1
1+r
U(c2, `2) (3.13)
s.t. (1− `1)W1 + (1−`2)W21+r + ω1 + E(ω2)1+r = c1 + c21+r
Once the agent reaches period two, he observes the realization of the value of
assets, ω2. If the realization of ω2 is greater than the expected value in period
one, it would represent a positive shock to wealth. Likewise, if ω2 is less than
the expected value in period one, the agent would experience a negative wealth
shock. In the context of the analysis here, a positive shock to housing prices
would correspond with a higher than expected realization of ω2. After observing
ω2, the agent may find it optimal to adjust his choice of leisure and consumption.
If the value of assets have increased we would observe a positive income effect and
leisure, `2, and consumption, c2, would both increase assuming they are normal
goods.
One concept that might lead to important and/or asymmetric responses to
house price shocks is the idea of framing by the individual households, or how
they view a shock to housing prices. Even for homeowners, it may not be the
case that all households view a positive house price shock as a good outcome for
their family. Consider a couple that owns a small home but intends to purchase
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a larger house when they have children. In this case, even though an increase in
housing prices means their own home value increases it also means it will be more
expensive for them to buy a larger home. These shocks to housing prices could be a
direct or indirect effect on the wealth of the household. As an indirect effect, given
that housing is typically the largest asset a household has, an increase in prices
might just make the household feel wealthier or poorer depending on borrowing
constraints and the stage of their life cycle.
On the other hand, if a rise in prices means the household is able to refinance to
a lower monthly mortgage payment or if it provides access to credit, the household
may feel a direct wealth effect. Households that are borrowing constrained may see
an increase in housing prices as an opportunity to obtain/increase a home equity
loan and relax those constraints. The question of the uses and benefits of relaxing
these borrowing constraints through home equity loans has been thoroughly stud-
ied within the finance literature. For example, Klyuev and Mills (2007) find that
the amount of home equity withdrawals have been increasing starting in the 1990s
and were generally spent to re-balance financial portfolios and replace unsecured
debt. Greenspan and Kennedy (2008) find that in addition to restructuring their
current debts, homeowners use the funds extracted from home equity loans to
finance home improvements and purchase other assets. However, other evidence
from a large representative sample of households in Mian and Sufi (2009) shows
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that for the most part small amounts are used to purchase investment properties
or pay down credit card balances, suggesting that the main use for these funds are
real outlays. These studies show the potential gains to households from increases
in housing prices and the ability to extract equity from their homes. If households
choose to reduce their labor supply, the additional funds from a home equity loan
may replace the lost wages.
This basic theoretical model of labor supply choices would suggest that an
unexpected increase in wealth would cause agents to decrease their labor supply.
However, in actuality many agents may face constraints on their labor supply
choices. For example, some agents may be able to only vary labor participation,
but not hours worked. For this reason the analysis focuses on both the extensive
and intensive margins of labor supply, as well as specific groups of workers that
may be less attached to the labor force. While many of the respondents of the
PSID may not be able to adjust their hours, others might have the ability to. For
instance, married women, part time workers, very young or old workers, the self-
employed, etc. are groups that may be more likely to have the ability to adjust
their labor hours.
The analysis that follows examines the effect of house price shocks on labor
supply choices. The change in housing prices from one year to the next contains
both anticipated and unanticipated changes in prices. However, it is difficult to
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determine the correct timing of an individual’s response to an expected change in
prices. In addition, much of the recent consumption/savings literature, including
Disney et al. (2010) and Attanasio et al. (2011), has studied unanticipated house
price shocks. If a household were to experience a rise in housing prices that they
had expected, according to the standard life-cycle model of consumption there
should be no response since agents are forward looking, if they are not credit
constrained. That is, any expected increase in housing prices has already been
incorporated into their labor supply decisions. If instead the household faces a
shock to housing prices that was unexpected, we might see a response in their
labor supply.
3.3 Data and House Price Shocks
The effect of house price shocks on the labor supply choices of households is
studied by combining two main data sets. The Panel Study of Income Dynam-
ics28 is a longitudinal household survey that began with a national representative
sample of 4,802 households in 1968. The panel continued annually from 1968-1997
and bi-annually from 1999-2009. The survey has followed the initial sample and
their children as they split off and formed new households. As of 2009, there were
8,690 families being interviewed. Both the original households and their split-
28Data obtained through the University of Michigan: PSID (2012).
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offs are included in this analysis. The PSID updated its sample several times by
adding immigrant and Latino families to attempt to more accurately capture the
changing make up of U.S. households. These families are included when available.
Also used in this paper is the restricted Geocode Match data from the PSID.
This data allows the author to observe the Metropolitan Statistical Area that the
household resides in, as well as other location measures such as the county. The
finer the location of the house price index, the more accurately it represents what
is happening to the individual households’ housing prices. The Geocode Match
Data is then used to link households to an MSA level house price index.
The analysis utilizes the All-Transactions Index for MSAs from the Federal
Housing Finance Agency.29 This index combines information from all transactions
including sales and appraisals in the metropolitan area. The All-Transactions In-
dex is well-suited for this analysis as it covers many years and provides information
for all currently defined MSAs. In addition, it is a constant quality measure of
house prices over time since it only using homes with repeat sales/appraisals.
Thus, the index avoids the problem of the quality of housing changing over time.
As of 2010, there were 374 MSAs defined by the U.S. Office of Management and
Budget. In addition, some of the largest of the metropolitan areas (New York, Los
Angeles, etc.) have been subdivided into smaller areas called Divisions. So the
29Data obtained through the Office of Policy Analysis and Research in Washington, DC: FHFA
(2012)
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All-Transactions Index includes 384 MSAs and/or MSA Divisions. There is price
index data for MSAs as early as 1975, and the data continues quarterly through
the end of 2011. By 1987, the All-Transactions Index had begun collecting housing
data for 80% of the MSAs. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding housing is
used to deflate the index. Thus, the housing data will reflect changes in housing
prices as compared to all other goods.
Finally, using the Geocode Data, the county unemployment rate from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics is combined with these two data sets. The county
unemployment rate is available beginning in 1982, and thus is the limiting factor
for the starting date of the data used in the analysis. This variable is used to
control for local labor market conditions. This way the effect of shocks to housing
prices can be isolated from other changes in the local economy.
The following methodology is used to calculate the unexpected portion of
changes in housing prices. A second order autoregressive process with MSA and
quarter fixed effects is used to approximate the quarterly house price index, as
described in Equation 3.14. Quarter fixed effects are included in order to correct
for any seasonal variation in housing prices.
HPIm,t = β1 + β2 ∗HPIm,t-1 + β3 ∗HPIm,t-2 + γm + ηq + um,t (3.14)
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where m is the MSA, t is time, indexed by the year and quarter. HPI is the
quarterly house price index, deflated using the CPI, that is regressed lagged values
of the All-Transactions Index from the past two quarters. γi is a fixed effect for
the the MSA, and ηq is a fixed effect for the quarter. Thus, the residuals of
the regression in Equation 3.14 will be unexplained differences within an MSA
over time. At each point in time the house price shock is calculated as the sum
of residuals from the past three years. This methodology ensures that for each
MSA in each year we can compare a cumulative sum that has the same starting
date, and forces there to be data for the past three years in that MSA. Using the
residuals from the previous regression, the house price shock, Shocki,t is calculated
as:
Shockm,t = ˆum,t + ˆum,t−1 + ...+ ˆum,t−12 (3.15)
where ˆum,t is the residual from Equation 3.14 for MSA m in time t.
30 This gives
us a measure of the portion of the change in housing prices that was unanticipated
over the past three years. Note that individuals who have lived in their MSA for
less than three years will be dropped, since the shock to housing prices for the past
three years is not relevant to them. This is a similar to the methodology presented
30The index is measured quarterly, so adding the residuals from the past 12 quarters to the
current quarter gives us the sum for three years. House price shocks of other lengths are tested
in Section 3.4.
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by Disney et al. (2010), Rainer and Smith (2010), and Farnham et al. (2011).31
The interpretation of the house price shocks is such that a positive value indicates
that prices in the MSA were rising faster than expected. Thus, it is possible that
individuals in the MSA believed housing prices were going to rise, however they
rose by more than what was anticipated.
Table 3.19 shows summary statistics for the linked PSID and FHFA data. It
compares males and females in the PSID by marital status. The samples shown
start in 1982, which is the beginning of the county unemployment rate data. The
samples contain a little less than 12,000 married households, about 10,000 unmar-
ried males, and about 11,000 unmarried females. The number of observations for
the unmarried households is much smaller however, since many people spend a
relatively short amount of single in the data, before transitioning into a married
household.
Unmarried men and women are more likely to be black and have lower educa-
tion. Married women are younger than their married male counterparts, however
unmarried women are significantly older. This is likely due to the number of wid-
owed/divorced women in this group. Among the unmarried respondents, males
are much more likely to have never been married. Married respondents have on
31One difference in our methodologies is after obtaining the residuals of Equation 3.14, these
authors’ shocks are calculated as the sum of residual from the beginning of the housing data.
However, unlike the U.K. House Price data used by Disney et al. (2010), the All-Transactions
Index starts at different dates for different MSAs. Therefore, simply cumulating the residuals
from Equation 3.14 would mean that the shock is not comparable across metropolitan areas.
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Table 3.19: Summary Statistics for PSID Households: 1982-2009
Married Males Unmarr. Males Married Fem. Unmarr. Fem.
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Demographics:
Birth Year 1946 16.9 1955 18.1 1948 16.2 1943 21.8
Black 0.069 0.254 0.161 0.367 0.068 0.251 0.224 0.417
Hispanic 0.063 0.243 0.065 0.246 0.069 0.253 0.053 0.224
White 0.856 0.351 0.760 0.427 0.853 0.354 0.722 0.448
< High School 0.192 0.394 0.204 0.403 0.159 0.365 0.271 0.445
High School 0.322 0.467 0.321 0.467 0.405 0.491 0.347 0.476
Some College 0.197 0.398 0.236 0.425 0.211 0.408 0.204 0.403
College 0.289 0.453 0.239 0.426 0.225 0.418 0.178 0.382
Family:
Never Married - - 0.511 0.500 - - 0.309 0.462
Divorced - - 0.393 0.488 - - 0.363 0.481
# of Children 0.904 1.150 0.211 0.646 0.904 1.150 0.474 0.951
Labor Market:
Labor Hours 34.51 23.29 33.75 22.85 22.62 20.51 22.21 22.28
Labor Income $47,433 $ 80,526 $ 32,822 $68,609 $ 19,594 $ 29,817 $18,454 $25,101
Hourly Wage $21.34 $ 21.19 $ 16.34 $ 16.88 $ 12.05 $ 15.03 $10.47 $13.53
Employed 0.742 0.438 0.708 0.455 0.568 0.495 0.526 0.499
Unemployed 0.024 0.153 0.074 0.262 0.018 0.134 0.053 0.224
Unemp. Rate 6.143 2.866 6.112 2.670 6.143 2.866 6.227 2.737
Housing:
Homeowner 0.835 0.371 0.397 0.489 0.835 0.371 0.487 0.500
House Value $150,602 $146,497 $51,759 $103,066 $150,602 $146,497 $56,605 $99,286
House Price Shock -0.112 24.997 0.530 26.091 -0.112 24.997 -0.103 23.840
Households 11,972 10,278 11,948 11,197
N 91,796 31,298 91,447 52,608
average one child, and unmarried respondents are less likely to have a child. For
the labor market variables, we see that men earn more than women across all
categories of marital status. Men are more likely to be employed compared to
women. In addition, married respondents earn more than unmarried respondents,
looking both at their overall labor earnings and hourly wage. Married respondents
are also more likely to be employed, and less likely to be unemployed. The vast
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majority of the homeowners in the PSID sample are married, with only 40% and
49% of unmarried males and females owning their home, respectively. We can see
that there is not much difference across types of households with regards to the
house price shocks in their area.
3.3.1 Endogeneity
Two potential problems of endogeneity must be addressed in the regressions
in Section 3.4. The first is the issue of homeownership status. As addressed in
Section 3.2, there may be different responses to house price shocks for renters ver-
sus owners. However, the respondent’s homeownership status may be endogenous
as those with higher or less volatile labor hours may be more likely to become
homeowners. To address this issue, we use multivariate matching on various de-
mographic controls to predict whether or not the respondent is a homeowner. The
variables used in multivariate matching are age and birth cohort, race and edu-
cation, family poverty status, state of residence, and marital status. The results
are presented controlling for the actual reported homeownership status, as well as
predicted homeownership status.32
32Henley (2004) includes both renters and owners in regressions and an interaction between
ownership status and housing prices. However, as shown in Table C.1 in the Appendix, owners
and renters in this sample have significantly different regression coefficients. This fact along
with the extremely small sample of renters makes renters a poor comparison group for owners.
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The second issue of endogeneity is that of wages, which should be controlled
for in some way in the labor supply regression. However, clearly using the respon-
dent’s actual wages is endogenous with respect to labor supply. Two different
methods are used to proxy for actual wages. Following the methodology used
in Henley (2004), we generate fitted wages for each individual. Fitted wages are
created using a two stage process. In the first stage, the respondent’s log wage
is regressed on a set of controls with person fixed effects.33 Then the predicted
log wage from this regression is used to instrument for actual wages in the labor
supply regressions. Fitted wages are generated separately for men and women.
Given that a fixed effect regression is used for the first stage, only time-varying
predictors of wages are used and these may not have much predictive power for
wages. The variables that are included in the first stage regression that will be
excluded in the labor supply regressions are: the square of the county unemploy-
ment rate, whether the respondent lives in an MSA, and whether the respondent
lives in a large MSA.
Since the fitted wages may not be a valid instrument and the variables used
to instrument for wages (square of unemployment, residence in MSA, residence in
large MSA) also may affect labor hours, a second method is also utilized. As an
33The the controls used in the first stage are the unemployment rate and its square, whether
the respondent lives in an MSA, whether the respondent lives in a large MSA, region of resi-
dence, marital status, number of children, the presence of young children, age and education
interactions, and year dummies.
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alternative strategy to instrument for wages, we use a combination of data from the
Census/American Community Survey34 and the Current Population Survey35 to
estimate average wages for the respondents based on group membership. Groups
are determined by 320 bins of age-sex-education-race-marital status. The Census
and ACS data covers the years 1980, 1990, and 2000-2009. CPS data is used to
fill in for the years 1989-1999. Since there is no data for the years 1981-1988, the
1980 averages are used. While this may be more exogenous than the fitted wages,
it is also a much more noisy estimate of wages. And note that the averages used
for the time period of 1980-1989 and 1990-1999 are not varying since there is only
wage information from the years of 1980 and 1990.
Given the potential issues with either of these methods for controlling for
endogenous wages in the labor supply regressions the main results will be presented
mostly without these wage instruments. However, Section C.3 in the Appendix
shows the results of the fixed effect regressions for our two primary analysis groups
(married women and older married males) using both of the above methods..
3.3.2 Exploring the Variation in House Price Shocks
Figure 3.11 shows the average percent change from one year to the next of
the All-Transactions Index. We can see from this figure that there is considerable
34Census and ACS data is obtained from Ruggles et al. (2010)
35CPS data is obtained from King et al. (2010)
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Figure 3.11: Average Yearly Percent Change in House Price Index
volatility in the house price index over time. Since the figure shows the percent
change in housing prices, when the line is above zero, prices are rising. The figure
also shows housing prices slowly increasing from the mid 1990s until 2005, during
the years of the housing boom in the United States. After that boom period, we
see the sharp decline in housing prices during the housing bust.
In contrast to Figure 3.11, Figure 3.12 shows the yearly average house price
shock from the All-Transactions Index. The series is considerably smoother than
the yearly percent change, though many of the same events are illustrated here.
In both figures we observe a decline in prices in the early 1980s and an increase
in prices in the late 1980s/early 1990s. The major difference in the two is that
in Figure 3.11 we can see the yearly percent change in housing prices slowly
increasing through the 1990s and 2000s and then quickly falling after 2005, but in
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Figure 3.12: Average House Price Shock
Figure 3.12 the increase during the housing boom is much more dramatic. This
suggests although prices were rising throughout that time period, they were rising
by faster than expected. In addition, there is much variation in the house price
shock across MSAs.
Table 3.20 illustrates this point, and shows the average value of the house price
shock in select states in 1995 (the beginning of the housing boom) and 2005 (the
peak of the housing boom). The last column shows the overall difference in the
house price shock during this time. We can see that during the housing boom
year, different places in the country had very different experiences in terms of
their local house price shocks. The first few rows show the values for the states
with the smallest change in house price shocks from 1995 to 2005. A few states
even had prices falling unexpectedly or perhaps not rising as quickly as expected.
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Table 3.20: House Price Shock by State: 1995 and 2005
State Shock in 1995 Shock in 2005 Difference
(2005-1995)
Smallest:
Utah 23.19 9.36 -13.83
Colorado 10.67 9.12 -1.55
Indiana 3.21 3.98 0.77
Nebraska 6.53 7.91 1.38
Ohio 5.66 7.75 2.09
South Dakota 5.63 8.70 3.07
Arkansas 4.76 8.99 4.23
Largest:
New York -22.23 49.92 72.15
Arizona -3.07 71.07 74.14
New Jersey -19.69 55.46 75.15
Massachusetts -24.34 52.28 76.62
Maryland -16.30 66.06 82.37
Rhode Island -22.35 69.29 91.64
Nevada -3.02 88.77 91.79
Florida -9.11 85.53 94.64
Washington D.C. -20.52 79.04 99.57
California -33.95 98.27 132.21
If we compare these to the states that had the largest change in house price shocks
during the housing boom we notice two facts. First, many but not all of the states
with the largest shocks had large negative house price shocks at the start of the
boom. Second, all of these states had much larger positive house price shocks in
2005, as compared to the small shock states. So not only did these states make up
for their negative shocks at the beginning of the time period, but prices increased
dramatically beyond what was expected.
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3.4 Results
The analysis is performed separately for married women, unmarried women,
married men, and unmarried men as each of these groups may have very different
patterns in their labor supply choices. A fixed effects model is used, to remove
any person-specific effects with regards to labor supply choices. The dependent
variable in each regression is either the log of usual weekly labor hours or a dummy
variable for the respondent being employed. The house price shock variable is
divided into its positive and negative component, as there may be different effects
for each on labor supply. Each are equal to zero when a shock of the opposite
sign occurs. For ease of interpretation, the absolute value of the negative house
price shocks are used. For the full set of control variables see Table C.2 in the
Appendix. As previously mentioned, the county unemployment rate is included in
the regressions in order to separate local business cycles from house price shocks.
The regressions to be estimated are:
log(Ni,t) = α0 + α1 ∗ Pos. House Price Shockt−1 + α2 ∗Neg. House Price Shockt−1
+ β′1 ∗Xi,t + νi + γt + ui,t
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Emp.i,t = α0 + α1 ∗ Pos. House Price Shockt−1 + α2 ∗Neg. House Price Shockt−1
+ β′1 ∗Xi,t + νi + γt + ui,t
where Ni,t is weekly work hours, Emp.i,t is an indicator equal to one if currently
employed, Xi,t are various individual and location controls
36, and νi and γt are
person and year fixed effects.
Many of the variables from the PSID apply to what has happened to the
respondent since the last interview or are current information, and the interviews
tend to be sometime mid-year. However, the house price data and unemployment
data is collected on a yearly basis. So to get as close to the timing of the labor
supply variables, without going past the date of the interview, the housing and
unemployment data is lagged by one year (or two for the post-1997 time period).
Also, since the size of the house price shock variable is in some cases quite large, it
is scaled down by the standard deviation of the variable, which is about 22 index
points. So the results should be interpreted as the effect to a one S.D. change in
the house price shock. Each regression included year dummy variables, to control
for any changes in overall labor hours across the whole country over time.
36Such as fitted or estimated average wage, education, number of children, age of youngest
child, indicator for pregnancy, region, county unemployment rate, etc. However, some of these
may not actually vary over time for every respondent and would be covered by person fixed
effects.
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The regressions shown are for groups that we expect to be marginal workers
and have less attachment to the labor force. Additional tables are shown in
Section C.3 in the Appendix for other groups of individuals that we do not expect
to be as responsive to price shocks such as unmarried women, and married and
unmarried males.
Table 3.21: Fixed Effects Model: Log of Labor Hours,
Married Females, Owners
Actual Ownership Status Predict Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log(Fitted Wage) - - - - 3.435∗∗∗ - 3.412∗∗∗
- - - - (0.358) - (0.342)
Pos. House Price Shockt−1 -0.109∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗ -0.038∗ -0.042∗∗ -0.035∗
(0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Neg. House Price Shockt−1 -0.0019 -0.011 0.009 0.015 0.004 0.011 0.008
(0.030) (0.033) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031)
Cnty Unemp. Ratet−1 - - -0.026∗∗ -0.022∗∗ -0.018∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗
- - (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Year Controls N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Location/Lbr Mkt Ctrls N N Y Y Y Y Y
Demographic Controls N N N Y Y Y Y
Fitted Wage Control N N N N Y N Y
N (Person-Year) 36,930 36,930 34,539 34,191 33,335 39,030 38,006
Groups 4,822 4,822 4,717 4,621 4,566 5,204 5,133
R2 (within) 0.004 0.009 0.011 0.101 0.112 0.0924 0.1045
Sample weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by person ID to account for each individual being
present multiple times. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
The results for the intensive margin of labor supply for married females are
presented first. The regressions in Table 3.21 include both employed and non-
employed women. In this first set of regressions, each subsequent column adds
more control variables. The first five specifications are for married female home-
owners using the actual homeownership status of the household. The last two
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columns use the predicted homeownership status using the process described in
Section 3.3.1. The county unemployment rate is included in the fixed effect re-
gressions to separate the effect of housing prices from the local labor market. As
expected, the sign of the county unemployment rate is negative suggesting that
work hours are less the higher the unemployment rate is. Across all specifications
the results show that positive house price shocks decrease the number of labor
hours that married women work. Here in Column (1), there are no control vari-
ables other than the house price shock variables and we see a reduction of labor
hours of 10.9% due to a one standard deviation increase of the positive house price
shock. In each column more explanatory variables are added: year fixed effects,
location controls and the county unemployment rate, demographic variables, and
finally the fitted wage.37 Compared to the regression with no controls, adding
these additional variables in columns (2)-(5) decreases the size of the estimated
coefficient of the postive house price shock variable, but it remains significant.
Finally, in Columns (6) and (7) I instead use the predicted homeowership status,
which also does not appear to have much effect on the estimated coefficients. The
coefficients range from -0.035 to -0.109, and in the baseline regression a one S.D.
increase in the positive house price shock leads married women to reduce their
hours of work by 4.3%. Since married females work an average of 25.5 hours per
37A set of four regresions using combinations of wage proxies and actual and predicted own-
ership status is shown in the Appendix in Section C.3
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week, this corresponds to about a one hour decrease in their work hours. Note
that these regressions do not control for unearned income of the wife (i.e. her
husband’s earnings) however including the fitted wage of the husband does not
change the results.
Table 3.22: Fixed Effects Model: Married Females, Owners
Dependent Log(Labor Hrs) Log(Labor Hrs) Employment
Variable Employed Only Status
Pos. House Price Shockt−1 -0.043** -0.008 -0.013**
(0.021) (0.010) (0.006)
Neg. House Price Shockt−1 0.0151 -0.008 0.002
(0.033) (0.013) (0.010)
Cnty Unemp. Ratet−1 -0.022** -0.003 -0.005*
(0.009) (0.004) (0.003)
Year Controls Y Y Y
N (Person-Year) 34,191 23,697 34,189
Groups 4,621 3,890 4,621
R2 (within) 0.101 0.059 0.087
Sample weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by person ID to account for each individual being
present multiple times. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
The baseline regression (4) from Table 3.21 is shown in the first column of
Table 3.22. The second column in Table 3.22 looks only at those married women
who are employed (log labor hours greater than zero). We examine this subset of
women to see if the observed responses from the baseline regression in Table 3.21
are at the intensive margin, however the coefficients on house price shocks are
not significant. Next we examine the effect of house price shocks on the extensive
margin of labor supply. The dependent variable in the third column is an indicator
variable equal to one if the wife is employed, and equal to zero if she is not. A
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value of zero would include both unemployed women and those out of the labor
force. We observe that positive house price shocks make a married women less
likely to be employed. So it appears that the main result from Table 3.21 is driven
entirely from married women choosing to exit the labor force.
We focus on married women as they may be more likely to adjust their work
hours or labor market status. In particular we know that in the majority of the
homeowner households, the husband is employed thus potentially giving the wife
the ability to work in the home or only work part time in the market. In particular
we see that 82% of married homeowner males are employed and 75% work at least
35 hours in the labor market.
One might be concerned that the effect on labor supply is not driven by housing
prices, but instead that labor market conditions are not adequately controlled for
using the county unemployment rate. However, if the observed results were due
to a boom in local business cycles, we would expect the effect on labor supply
to be in the opposite direction as individuals can more easily find work. Thus, if
anything not controlling properly for business cycle would attenuate these results.
However, other methods of controlling for labor market conditions are explored
in Section 3.4.3.
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3.4.1 Male Respondents
Section 3.4.1 explores the relationship between house price shocks and labor
supply choices for some of the male respondents in the sample. Married males
are employed at a very high rate and are not likely to exhibit much flexibility in
their labor supply decisions. I show the results for all married male respondents
in Table C.8 in the Appendix. Instead in this section, the analysis focuses on a
group of males that may have more flexible labor supply choices: those nearing
retirement.
Table 3.23: Fixed Effects Model: Log of Hours, Married Men ≥65 Yrs, Owners
Actual Ownership Status Predict. Ownership
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Fitted Wage - - - - -0.316 - -0.060
- - - - (1.256) - (1.181)
Pos. House Price Shockt−1 -0.116** 0.006 0.024 0.021 0.014 -0.015 -0.023
(0.045) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Neg. House Price Shockt−1 0.0980 0.115* 0.162** 0.154** 0.151** 0.119* 0.116*
(0.063) (0.065) (0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.063) (0.065)
Cnty Unemp. Ratet−1 - - -0.009 -0.007 -0.010 -0.013 -0.014
- - (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Year Controls N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Location/Lbr Mkt Ctrls N N Y Y Y Y Y
Demographic Controls N N N Y Y Y Y
Fitted Wage Control N N N N Y N Y
N (Person-Year) 4,131 4,131 3,929 3,907 3,829 4,425 4,323
Groups 858 858 833 825 818 928 917
R2 (within) 0.007 0.088 0.085 0.092 0.090 0.093 0.0911
Sample weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by person ID to account for each individual being
present multiple times. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Another group of particular interest is older males that are nearing retirement.
This group of males may be more likely to have the ability to adjust their labor
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supply through switching to part time work or adjusting their retirement date.
Table 3.23 examines married homeowner males ages 65 and over and sequentially
adds in control variables. Looking at this group, we see interesting asymmetries
in the response to house price shocks compared to married women, who only re-
sponded to positive house price shocks. In contrast, these data strongly suggest
that older males increase their work hours in response to a negative house price
shock. In particular, a one standard deviation larger negative house price shock
increases labor hours by 11.5-16.2%. Given the coefficient in the baseline regres-
sion of 0.154 and since older married males work an average of about 10 hours
per week, this represents a increase of about 1.5 hours.
Table 3.24: Fixed Effects Model: Married Men ≥65 Yrs Old, Owners
Dependent Log of Log(Labor Hrs) Employment
Variable Labor Hours Employed Only Status
Pos. House Price Shockt−1 0.021 -0.005 0.008
(0.052) (0.080) (0.014)
Neg. House Price Shockt−1 0.1545** -0.026 0.077***
(0.068) (0.084) (0.021)
Cnty Unemp. Ratet−1 -0.007 0.015 -0.005
(0.015) (0.027) (0.005)
Year Controls Y Y Y
N (Person-Year) 3,907 1,143 3,906
Groups 825 393 825
R2 (within) 0.092 0.105 0.074
Sample weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by person ID to account for each individual being
present multiple times. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
As with the married women, we examine the responses of older married males
across three different specifications and dependent variables. Limiting the sample
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of older married males in Table 3.24 to only those who are employed in the second
column, I find that there is no significant effect of house price shocks. Instead,
the using employment status as the dependent variable we see that the results ob-
served on the intensive margin are due to movements in and out of employment,
perhaps as individuals delay their retirement. Given the estimated coefficient of
0.77, married males increase their probability of being employed by 7.7 percent in
response to a one standard deviation larger negative house price shock. One po-
tential explanation is that homeowners often have significant mortgage obligations
and a negative house price shock represents a decrease in wealth which causes a
need to extend their working years. As with the results for married women, the
direction of the effect of negative house price shocks is such that if it was simply
picking up the effect of local business cycles we would observe the opposite sign.
So, if the county unemployment rate is not sufficiently controlling for local labor
market conditions, the true effect on labor supply would be even larger than the
observed effect.
One additional analysis for the respondents is to not look at them as individ-
uals, but rather as an entire household unit. If we think about unitary models
of households where they make joint decisions, then it is perhaps appropriate
to think about house price shocks as affecting the labor supply choices of both
spouses simultaneously. Considering the couple as a whole may also help provide
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Table 3.25: Fixed Effects Model: Household Level Analysis
Dependent Total Diff. in Hours: Both
Variable Labor Hours H-W Employed
Pos. Change in HPIt−1 0.002 0.815** -0.006
(0.016) (0.322) (0.006)
Neg. Change in HPIt−1 0.0049 0.311 0.002
(0.027) (0.518) (0.010)
Cnty Unemp. Ratet−1 0.003 0.275 -0.005
(0.007) (0.141) (0.003)
Year Controls Y Y Y
N (Person-Year) 34,110 34,110 34,106
Groups 4,490 4,490 4,490
R2 (within) 0.273 0.187 0.105
evidence of specialization in household roles. I consider a few specifications of
the couple as a whole in Table 3.25. In each case a fixed effects model is used
at the level of the couple and demographic control variables (age, education) are
included for both the husband and wife. The first regression uses the total labor
hours of the household as the dependent variable. I find no significant effect of
house price shocks suggesting the the overall amount of time spent working in the
labor market for the couple does not change. The dependent variable in the next
column is the difference in labor hours between the husband and the wife. Here
there is a positive and significant effect of positive shocks to housing prices. The
average difference between the husband’s and the wife’s hours is about 19 hours.
So, the results show that unexpected increases in local housing prices lead to an
increase in this gap of 0.82 hours. While this does not tell us who is adjusting their
hours, it does provide some evidence of increased specialization in the household,
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given the previous results from Table 3.21. Finally, I look at how the house price
shocks affect the probability that both spouses and I do not see any significant
results.
3.4.2 Demographics Analysis
Figure 3.13: Fixed Effect Models: Log of Labor Hours, Married Females, Owners
The following section delves deeper into the question of what groups are driving
the results that positive house price shocks decrease the labor supply provided by
married women. The total sample of married women is divided into sub-samples
based on various economic and demographic groups such as education, income,
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race, and family structure. We know that not all married women may have the
same abilities to adjust their labor hours or participation and thus this exercise
may also shed some light on that question as well if certain groups do not respond
to changes in wealth. In particular, it may be the case that those families with
higher income have the flexibility to allow the wife to stay out of the labor force.
Also, we might expect that the couples that it is beneficial for the wife to work less
are those with children to care for. In each model in this section, the regression
model used corresponds to that of column (4) in Table 3.21. To present the results
in a succinct way, each bar in Figure 3.13 represents the estimated coefficient for
the positive house price shock variable in a different regression model. The red
line across the figure shows the estimated coefficient from the baseline regression
model of column (4) in Table 3.21. The black line over each bar show the 95%
confidence interval for the coefficient so if the top or bottom of the black line falls
within the bar, the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
The first exercise in this section explores the difference across education groups
for the married woman in the baseline sample. The first two bars in Figure 3.13
divide the sample based on the final completed education of the wife where ’Low’
education indicates she has a high school degree or less and ’High’ education indi-
cates she has some college or more education. We see that it is the higher educated
women who respond to positive house price shocks, and that the estimated co-
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efficients are slightly larger than that of the whole sample. We may think that
the wives with higher education have more flexible careers and are more likely to
choose to work part time or work in the home. Next in Figure 3.13 we compare
younger and older married women, with the sample split at the median which is
43 years old. Though only significant at the 10% level, the results do show that
younger women respond to positive house price shocks and older women do not.
Next I examine how house price shocks affect households with low versus high
income. Since the households are at different point in the lifetime wage profile
depending on their age, I use an age adjusted measure of the husband’s income at
the beginning of the sample. The results show that it is among the higher income
families that the wives decrease the labor hours in response to positive house price
shocks. One possible explanation is that it is only the households with higher in-
come that can afford to have the woman reduce her hours. Though the results
are not significant for the lower income households, there is not a significant dif-
ference between the estimated coefficients so it could be that the coefficients are
just imprecisely measured.
In the last several columns of Figure 3.13 we explore differences in responses
to positive house price shocks by the family structure of the household. First,
comparing household with and without children under the age of 18 in the home,
we observe that married women with children are reducing their work hours due
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to positive house price shocks, whereas those without children at home are not.
Women with children are perhaps choosing to stay at home and spend more
time caring for their children during good times, whereas they may not has as
much incentive to reduce work hours without children. Continuing as before,
I investigate to see if this effect of house price shocks on married women with
children is coming at the extensive or intensive margin of labor supply. I find
no significant effect of house price shocks on employed wives with children in the
home. In addition, I find that positive house price shocks decrease the probability
of employment for women with children in the home by 1.9%.38 This effect is
slightly larger than the effect for all married women. We might think that when
the household experiences an increase in wealth it gives the wife the opportunity
to stop working and stay home with the kids. Looking at households with children
ages 0-10 and children ages 11-17, the estimated coefficient is significant at only
the 10% level for households with younger children with no significant effect for
household with older children. This complements the previous hypothesis since
younger children likely require more care than older children, especially for those
not yet enrolled in school. Finally, these households are further divided by family
structure as well as low and high final completed education. The only significant
result of house price shocks on labor hours appears for household with children
38Tables available on request.
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where the wife has higher education. In addition, the estimated coefficient is larger
than the baseline estimations at -0.084 which corresponds to a 8.4% reduction in
labor hours. One explanation of this is the differences in child-rearing by social
class which has been studied in depth in the sociology literature (Hays (1996),
Vincent and Ball (2007), Lareau (2002)). Among the higher educated women,
perhaps there is a stronger preference or opportunity to care for children yourself
and engage in what is termed “intensive mothering” in the literature. This model
of child-rearing suggests a very direct, time-intensive involvement in the child’s
development.
3.4.3 Robustness Checks
One potential concern is that the lag of the county unemployment rate is not
sufficiently controlling for local labor market conditions in the regression models.
To address this, Table 3.26 provides results for several other methods of labor
market controls for married females in the PSID. The baseline results from Col-
umn (4) in Table 3.21 are shown as well for comparison. In Column (A), I include
MSA fixed effects to broadly control for any unobserved characteristics the MSA,
and although this does decrease the size of the coefficient the positive house price
shocks are still significant at the 10% level. Next in Column (B), the MSA unem-
ployment rate is included rather than the county unemployment rate, as in some
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Table 3.26: Other Labor Market Controls: Log of Hours, Married Females, Owners
Baseline (A) (B) (C) (D)
Pos. House Price Shockt−1 -0.043** -0.039* -0.058** -0.044** -0.040*
(0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.021) (0.022)
Neg. House Price Shockt−1 0.015 0.006 0.060 0.030 0.009
(0.033) (0.033) (0.048) (0.034) (0.036)
MSA Unemp. Ratet−1 - - -0.042** - -
- - (0.017) - -
Cnty Unemp. Ratet−1 -0.022** -0.018* - -0.020** -0.021**
(0.009) (0.010) - (0.009) (0.011)
Cnty Unemp. Ratet−2 - - - -0.009 -
- - - (0.008) -
Chg. Med. Family Inc.t−1 - - - - -0.391
- - - - (0.457)
MSA Controls N Y N N N
Year Controls Y Y Y Y Y
N (Person-Year) 34,191 34,197 21,893 32,494 30,043
Groups 4,621 4,621 3,827 4,533 4,147
R2 (within) 0.101 0.129 0.091 0.097 0.104
Sample weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by person ID to account for each individual
being present multiple times. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
cases the county boundaries will go beyond the borders of the MSA. However, this
reduces the sample size as the MSA unemployment is only available beginning in
1990. Next I allow for a more flexible lag structure on the county unemployment
rate. Finally in Column (D), another measure of local business cycles is included,
the change in the median family income in the metropolitan area. Including this
control does not change the coefficient, but increases the standard errors slightly.
As with the previous tables, Table 3.27 shows the same specification as Column
(4) in Table 3.21 to show the effects of house price shocks on married female
renters. The channel through which shocks to housing prices could affect renters
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Table 3.27: Fixed Effect Model: Married Females, Renters
Dependent Log of Log(Labor Hrs) Employment
Variable Labor Hours Employed Only Status
Pos. House Price Shockt−1 -0.026 0.015 -0.016
(0.059) (0.023) (0.016)
Neg. House Price Shockt−1 0.0061 0.041 -0.018
(0.100) (0.035) (0.028)
Cnty Unemp. Ratet−1 -0.037 -0.021* -0.006
(0.025) (0.011) (0.008)
Year Controls Y Y Y
N (Person-Year) 7,612 4,814 7,612
Groups 2,132 1,669 2,132
R2 (within) 0.079 0.051 0.069
Sample weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by person ID to account for each individual being
present multiple times. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
is two-fold. First, to the extent that there is a strong correlation between housing
prices and rental prices, this may represent a decrease in available wealth/income
to the household. On the other hand, if rents do not rise when housing prices do,
rents may seem relatively cheaper. Second, if the renter couple is planning to buy
a home in the next few years, this increase in housing prices represents a decrease
in their lifetime wealth as they will have to pay more to purchase a home in the
future. However, the link between wealth and house price shocks is clearly not as
strong for renters as for owners. The three specifications shown are for the effect
on the log of labor hours, log of labor hours for women that are employed, and
employment status. Across all three specifications, we see no significant effect of
house price shocks for married renters.
142
Chapter 3. House Price Shocks and Labor Supply Choices
Table 3.28: Log of Hours: Other Shock Lengths, Married Females, Owners
Shock Length 1 year 2 year 3 year 4 year 6 year
Pos. House Price Shockt−1 -0.036** -0.045** -0.043** -0.038* -0.032
(0.014) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
Neg. House Price Shockt−1 -0.0002 0.022 0.015 0.023 0.011
(0.028) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.035)
Cnty Unemp. Ratet−1 -0.022** -0.024*** -0.022** -0.024** -0.022**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Year Controls Y Y Y Y Y
N (Person-Year) 39,886 37,574 34,191 32,105 28,924
Groups 5,638 5,409 4,621 4,475 4,050
R2 (within) 0.104 0.103 0.101 0.100 0.097
Sample weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by person ID to account for each individual
being present multiple times. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Recall that the house price shock variable in the baseline regressions was cal-
culated as the sum of residuals for the past three years from Equation 3.14. Any
households that have not lived in the MSA for at least three years are excluded
as the shocks from the past three years are not what they have experienced. The
results presented in Table 3.28 show the effect of house price shocks of differing
lengths on the log of labor hours for married female homeowners. In bold is the
column that contains the baseline specification with the 3 year shock length vari-
able. Also shown are the results measuring the house price shock as the sum of
residuals from Equation 3.14 for the past one, two, four, and six years. As with
the baseline specification, in each case any respondents who have not lived in the
MSA for the relevant length of time are excluded. I scale each shock variable by
the standard deviation for ease of interpretation. Across all specifications, we see
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consistent evidence that married women reduce their labor hours in response to a
positive house price shock.39 The size of the effect is very similar in all cases, with
a one standard deviation increase in the positive house price shock decreasing the
wife’s labor hours by 3.2 to 4.5%.
Table 3.29: Three Year Percent Change in HPI, Married Females, Owners
Dependent Log of Log(Labor Hrs) Employment
Variable Labor Hours Employed Only Status
Pos. Change in HPIt−1 -0.049 -0.021 -0.035
(0.080) (0.032) (0.024)
Neg. Change in HPIt−1 -0.0092 -0.006 -0.013
(0.171) (0.065) (0.053)
Cnty Unemp. Ratet−1 -0.017** -0.003 -0.003
(0.008) (0.003) (0.002)
Year Controls Y Y Y
N (Person-Year) 40,996 28,407 40,994
Groups 5,870 4,882 5,870
R2 (within) 0.103 0.062 0.087
Sample weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by person ID to account for each individual
being present multiple times. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
The final table in this section shows us the effect of the total change in housing
prices, combining expected and unexpected changes. In Table 3.29 we use the
percent change in the House Price Index over the past three years to be consistent
with the measure of house price shocks used previously in the paper. As before,
those who have not lived in the MSA for the past three years are excluded. We see
across all specifications that there is no significant effect of the percent change in
39Similar results are shown in Table C.3 in the Appendix with a constant sample across
specifications with different shock lengths.
144
Chapter 3. House Price Shocks and Labor Supply Choices
housing prices over the past three years.40 This suggests that it is the fact that the
change in prices is unexpected that leads these married women to alter their labor
supply. The table shows the results for the log of labor hours for married female
owners, log of labor hours for employed females, and the employment status of
married female owners.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper explored the relationship between shocks to household wealth and
individual labor supply decisions. In particular, we observed how homeowners
responded to positive or negative shocks to housing prices, comparing married
and unmarried males and females. The analysis utilized restricted household level
panel data from the PSID linked with MSA level house price index from the
Federal Housing Finance Agency and county level unemployment rates from the
BLS. Housing prices are approximated by a second order autoregressive process
with MSA and quarter fixed effects. The residuals from this first stage regression
are cumulated for the past three years, and this sum provides a measure of the
unexpected change in housing prices. Any households that have moved into the
MSA in the past three years are excluded from the analysis as the house price
shock from the past three years is not relevant to their experiences.
40Results for the percent change in the HPI over the past year are shown in Table C.4 the
Appendix.
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The analysis on labor supply choices is conducted on homeowners since they
have a direct wealth effect from a change in housing prices. Regressions on renters
show no significant effect of house price shocks. Fixed effect regressions are used
with the dependent variables being either the log of labor hours or a dummy
variable for employment status, controlling for various other observables including
a measure of wages and the county unemployment rate. I use several methods to
deal with the potential endogeneity problems with the homeownership and hourly
wage variables. The analysis is performed separately by gender and by marital
status as these groups are likely to have very different responses in their labor
supply to the control variables. Two groups that are of particular interest are
married women and older respondents who are nearing retirement since they are
likely to have more flexibility than other groups in their labor supply choices. I
find that married women decrease their labor supply when they experience positive
house price shocks, and provide evidence that this effect occurs along the extensive
margin. On the other hand, married males ages 65 and over are more likely
employed in response to a negative house price shock.
In addition, I focus in on particular demographic and economic groups to de-
termine what groups are responding to changes in house price shocks. Interesting
patterns emerge in this analysis showing that it is the high income, high education
women with children that are most affected by positive house price shocks. We
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see the strongest effect for women with children ages 0-10 in the home, suggesting
that women are taking the opportunity of the positive wealth shock to stay home
and care for their children rather than work in the labor market, at least when
the children are young. One reason why we see a strong response among the high
income/high education wives is that they actually may have the ability to do so,
whereas it may not be possible for the lower income wives to exit the labor market.
There has been considerable interest in how the changing economic conditions
affect households, especially since the recent recession. Housing prices are a par-
ticularly interesting economic factor to analyze since housing contributes such a
large fraction of household wealth. This means that changes in housing prices
have potentially very large wealth effects for homeowners. In addition, a rise in
housing prices may be good for some homeowners but a detriment to a household
looking to move from renting to owning. These results provide specific responses
of households to such events as the housing boom of the 1990s-2000s and the
housing market crash of 2007. The asymmetric results for positive versus neg-
ative shocks to housing prices additionally shed light on what groups we might
expect to respond in the case of unexpected increases or unexpected decreases in
housing prices.
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In this dissertation we explored the broad effects of economic shocks on several
types of household decisions. The unifying theme in this work is that changes in
the financial situation of households have important implications for their behavior
and often these responses are asymmetric to gains versus losses. In addition,
we see asymmetric effects on household behavior for men and women. So if a
household responds in one direction to a positive economic shock, it may not have
the opposite reaction to an equal negative economic shock.
In Chapter 1 we saw a decrease in marital stability when the husband expe-
rienced a decrease in his predicted permanent income. Data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth of 1979 gave us observations of a particular birth
cohort for much of their lives from a time before most of their marriages through
the end of many of them. Just as the respondents are likely to have done them-
selves, we made a prediction of the spouses’ permanent income in each year of
their marriage using only the information available up until that year. The change
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in the predicted permanent income in the current year compared to the year of
marriage is taken to be a shock to income. Although we see that the couple is
more likely to divorce if the husband has a negative income shock, we only observe
this for the wife if she loses her job.
Next in Chapter 2 the effect of a different type of economic shock on marital
stability is studied: shocks to local housing prices. Local house price shocks pro-
vide an exogenous change in wealth for households in the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics. The probability of divorce decreases with an increase in positive house
price shocks, particularly for low income and low education families. This result
fits in with a large literature in sociology and psychology showing that with an
increase in wealth couples face fewer financial stressors and are less likely to dis-
solve their marriage. Another possibility is that the higher cost of housing in the
area increases the amount the couple with have to pay for housing if they were to
divorce and live in separate residences.
Finally Chapter 3 examines the effect of local house price shocks on the labor
supply choices of homeowner households in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
For married women, a positive house price shock induces them to exit the labor
force, likely to care for children. The chapter then explores interesting response
patterns by education and family structure of the household. We also see that
older married males are more likely to be employed in response to a negative house
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price shock. As expected we do not see responsiveness in labor supply for married
males and other groups that are unlikely to adjust their work hours.
Some next steps for this research include extending the first two chapters to
other panel data sets. For example, using data from younger birth cohorts in
the first chapter would allow us to see if the observed effects are cohort specific
or differ in size/direction across cohorts. The second and third chapters can
also benefit from the addition of data from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth as the number of respondents in a given birth cohort are too small to
be separately analyzed in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Further work
remains to examine how changes in a household’s economic opportunities affect
other types of behavior, such as fertility.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Survival Probabilities
We can see that in general the respondents who married at older ages were less likely
to have divorced by any particular time. For instance, the probability of a marriage
lasting 5 years in this sample is 72% if the individual married at age 20, but is 84% if the
individual married at age 30. 1 To be as consistent as possible with WW, I determined
the end date of a marriage as when the couple was separated or divorced, whichever
occured at the earliest date.
A.2 Constructing Predicted Permanent Income
for Spouses
Since the previous year’s prediction of permanent income is included in the current
year’s regression, the equations below are slightly different than those used for the
respondents. Since the spouse will not be observed in the data until the time of marriage,
1Table A.1 contains the probability only for those married between the ages of 18 and 36.
The complete data set has individuals marrying from 14 to 48 years old and displays similar
trends. The other ages are not included in the table due to the small number of observations.
The complete table is available on request.
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Table A.1: Survival Probability of Marriage by Age
Age Married 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
Duration
0 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00
1 0.93 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.95
2 0.87 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.92 0.95 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.91 0.92
3 0.80 0.83 0.82 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.92 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.93 0.90 0.86 0.90
4 0.73 0.76 0.76 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.89 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.92 0.87 0.79 0.86
5 0.66 0.70 0.72 0.77 0.79 0.82 0.83 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.91 0.81 0.79 0.82
6 0.62 0.66 0.68 0.75 0.74 0.78 0.80 0.78 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.81 0.91 0.75 0.79 0.76
7 0.59 0.64 0.64 0.72 0.72 0.75 0.77 0.76 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.76 0.79 0.79 0.87 0.74 0.76 0.73
8 0.56 0.60 0.62 0.69 0.70 0.73 0.76 0.74 0.77 0.77 0.75 0.78 0.74 0.76 0.77 0.83 0.71 0.74 0.73
9 0.52 0.59 0.61 0.67 0.68 0.71 0.74 0.72 0.74 0.74 0.70 0.75 0.71 0.75 0.74 0.80 0.71 0.73 0.72
10 0.50 0.56 0.59 0.65 0.66 0.69 0.73 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.68 0.74 0.69 0.73 0.70 0.76 0.69 0.70 0.72
11 0.48 0.54 0.56 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.71 0.66 0.72 0.67 0.71 0.69 0.74 0.66 0.69 0.72
12 0.46 0.52 0.55 0.62 0.63 0.67 0.70 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.65 0.71 0.65 0.70 0.64 0.72 0.65 0.68 0.72
13 0.45 0.51 0.53 0.61 0.62 0.65 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.68 0.64 0.69 0.65 0.69 0.64 0.69 0.64 0.68 0.72
14 0.44 0.50 0.52 0.60 0.61 0.64 0.67 0.66 0.64 0.65 0.62 0.69 0.63 0.67 0.61 0.68 0.64
15 0.43 0.49 0.51 0.59 0.59 0.63 0.66 0.64 0.63 0.64 0.61 0.68 0.61 0.67 0.61 0.67 0.64
16 0.43 0.48 0.50 0.58 0.59 0.61 0.65 0.63 0.61 0.63 0.60 0.68 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.67
17 0.42 0.47 0.49 0.56 0.58 0.60 0.64 0.62 0.61 0.62 0.60 0.67 0.59 0.66 0.61
18 0.41 0.46 0.48 0.56 0.57 0.60 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.66 0.57 0.66
19 0.41 0.45 0.47 0.55 0.56 0.59 0.62 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.58 0.65 0.56
20 0.39 0.44 0.46 0.55 0.55 0.58 0.61 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.65
21 0.38 0.44 0.46 0.54 0.54 0.57 0.60 0.58 0.59 0.58 0.58
22 0.38 0.43 0.45 0.53 0.53 0.56 0.60 0.57 0.59 0.58
23 0.37 0.43 0.45 0.52 0.53 0.56 0.60 0.57 0.59
24 0.36 0.42 0.45 0.52 0.53 0.56 0.59 0.57
25 0.35 0.42 0.44 0.52 0.52 0.55 0.59
Observations 713 940 903 930 906 775 696 501 441 363 312 246 195 189 140 127 105 80 79
I take the year of marriage as the first year to generate predictions. Since the first year
of marriage could potentially be any time during the sample, dummy variables for the
year are included. Let M be the year of first marriage.
For Male Respondents:
log(Y permi ) = α20 ∗ zi + β′20 ∗ xi,20 + δ1,20 ∗ log(Yi,20) ∗ (1− di,20)
+ δ2,20 ∗ di,02 + vi,20 + upermi (A.1)
First the preceding regression is run, similar to Equation 1.1. zi are charac-
teristics that do not change over time. xi,20 are time-varying characteristics at
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their values at age 20. The variable d is an indicator function for an individual
who reports zero earnings at age 20. Finally in the error term is vi,20, the portion
of permanent income not explained by the information at age 20, and upermi , the
unexplained variation in permanent income.
Now we find predicted permanent income at age 20:
log(Y pi,20) = αˆ20 ∗ zi + βˆ′20 ∗ xi,20 + δˆ1,20 ∗ log(Yi,20) ∗ (1− di,20) + δˆ2,20 ∗ di,20 (A.2)
Since we are not able to construct similar models for the male spouses of female
respondents, we save the estimated coefficients, αˆ20, βˆ20, δˆ1,20, and δˆ2,20, from
equation A.2 for later.
Next, using the predicted permanent income for the male respondents from
age 20 as an additional explanatory variable, we estimate coefficients using the
new information available at age 21. This is repeated for each year until age 40.
log(Y permi ) = γt ∗ log(Y pi,t−1) + β′t ∗ xi,t + δ1,t ∗ log(Yi,t) ∗ (1− di,t)
+ δ2,t ∗ di,t + vi,t + upermi (A.3)
for t=21,...,40.
After each regression the estimated coefficients are stored and after completing
this process for all years, we have with coefficients from each year after a couple
was married: αˆ20, βˆ20, δˆ1,M , δˆ2,20, ..., γˆ40, βˆ40, δˆ1,40, δˆ2,40
Finally, the predicted permanent income is constructed for each year for the
male spouses of female respondents using the estimated coefficients collected. Let
xSpi,20 be a vector of time-varying characteristics for the first spouse of respondent
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i at the age of first marriage M . Likewise define zSpi,M , Y Spi,M , and dSpi,M to
be time-invariant spouse characteristics, spouse income, and a dummy variable
for zero income for the spouse of i. Then to find each male spouse’s predicted
permanent income in the year of first marriage:
log(Y Sppi,M) = γˆt ∗ log(Y Sppi,M−1) + αˆM ∗ zSpi,M + βˆM ∗ xSpi,M
+ δˆ1,M ∗ Y Spi,M ∗ (1− dSpi,M) + δˆ2,M ∗ dSpi,M (A.4)
Recall that for the first year of marriage the previous year’s prediction was con-
structed using multivariate matching to represent the unobserved past history.
The remaining years are constructed similarly using the relevant coefficients.
log(Y Sppi,t) = γˆt∗log(Y Sppi,t−1)+βˆt∗xSpi,t+δˆ1,t∗Y Spi,t∗(1−dSpi,t)+δˆ2,t∗dSpi,t (A.5)
A.3 Comparing Respondent and Spouse Popu-
lations
In each histogram in Figure A.1 the size of a bar is constant. This shows further
information about the distribution of estimated income shocks for the respondents
and spouses. We see very similar distributions among the male respondents and
male spouses, and the female respondents and female spouses. In both cases,
the distribution of shocks for the spouses are slightly more dispersed. However,
we note that overall males have tighter distributions and females have a wider
distribution.
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Figure A.1: Histograms of Change in Predicted Permanent Income
A.4 Full Probit Specification
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Table A.2: Full Probit Model of Effects on Divorce Probability
W: Pos. ∆Perm. Inc.t−1 0.0009 Age Difference, Husband-Wife:
(0.0019)
W: Neg. ∆Perm. Inc.t−1 -0.0021 -3 to 0 years -0.0087*
(0.0016) (0.0048)
H: Pos. ∆Perm. Inc.t−1 -0.0004 1 to 3 years -0.0027
(0.0029) (0.0053)
H: Neg .∆Perm. Inc.t−1 0.0036** 4 to 7 years 0.0015
(0.0018) (0.0062)
High Schoolt−1 -0.0063 > 7 years 0.0012
(0.0069) (0.0092)
Some Colleget−1 -0.0121* H: Age Married, Duration
(0.0062)
Colleget−1 -0.0200*** <21, 1-2 years 0.0128
(0.0048) (0.0227)
W: Same Educt−1 0.0050 <21, 3-5 years 0.0381
(0.0047) (0.0339)
W: More Educ.t−1 -0.0031 <21, 6-12 years 0.0103
(0.0073) (0.0192)
1-3 childrent−1 -0.0063 <21, 13-38 years -0.0161*
(0.0039) (0.0074)
4 or more childrent−1 0.0037 21-23, 1-2 years 0.0110
(0.0091) (0.0174)
Children ≤ 5 yrst−1 -0.0075** 21-23, 3-5 years 0.0023
(0.0030) (0.0138)
Same Religion -0.0117*** 21-23, 6-12 years 0.0011
(0.0025) (0.0123)
Resp. From Intact Home -0.0019 21-23, 13-32 years -0.0091
(0.0032) (0.0086)
H: Hispanic 0.0017 24-30, 1-2 years -0.0071
(0.0040) (0.0098)
H: Black 0.0067* 24-30, 3-5 years 0.0035
(0.0041) (0.0128)
Same Race 0.0049 24-30, 6-12 years -0.0061
(0.0040) (0.0098)
Westt−1 0.0074* 24-30, 13-29 years -0.0156*
(0.0049) (0.0054)
Centralt−1 0.0030 >30, 1-2 years -0.0066
(0.0038) (0.0093)
Southt−1 0.0129*** >30, 3-5 years -0.0108
(0.0042) (0.0077)
Own Home -0.0138***
(0.0032)
At Marriage:
W: Same Educ. -0.0034
(0.0050)
W: More Educ. -0.0062
(0.0058)
Own Home 0.0063
(0.0045)
Have Children 0.0027
(0.0045)
Year Controls Y
N (Person-Year) 17,744
Couples 2,299
R2 0.063
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B.1 Further Description of House Price Shocks
The following two figures further explore the differences in the house price
shock across locations discussed in the end of Section 2.3.1. Figure B.1 shows
panels for six selected states that were among those most affected during the
housing boom. The figures show the average house price shock for each of the six
states by year from 1979-2009. Even between these states we see there are differ-
ences in their experiences of house price shocks over the time period, especially in
the earlier years. However, all of these states exhibit the same general pattern as
observed in Figure 2.5 in the time period of 1995 to 2005.
Next Figure B.2 shows panels for four selected states that faced the smallest
changes in the house price shock over the period 1995 to 2005. Again, the figure
shows the average yearly house price shock for each of these four states in order
to compare them to the states with large changes in the house price shock. All
of these states have a relatively flat series for the house price shock over the time
period, in stark contrast to what was experienced in California, Arizona, Florida,
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Figure B.1: Large Shock States over Time
etc. Only Colorado has any semblance of the spike in the house price shock we
see for the states in Figure B.1. However, even this is dwarfed by the size of the
house price shocks in the other states.
These two figures together make it clear that although prices were rising
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the experiences across different locations
were not equal. Thus, the persistent increase observed in Figure 2.5 are due to
the fact that some locations had very large increases in the variable during the
housing boom years and some locations had no change in the variable during those
years. So there is a substantial amount of variation across states and MSAs with
which to identity an effect of the house price shock on the decision to divorce.
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Figure B.2: Small Shock States over Time
B.2 Additional Tables
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Table B.1: Full Probit Model of Divorce Hazard:Homeowners
Variable Marg. Eff. Std. Err. Marg. Eff. Std. Err. Marg. Eff. Std. Err.
Pos. House Price Shockt−1 -0.0014∗∗ (0.0007) -0.0014∗∗ (0.0007) -0.0014∗∗ (0.0007)
Neg. House Price Shockt−1 -0.0003 (0.0011) -0.0003 (0.0011) -0.0003 (0.0011)
County Unemp. Ratet−1 -0.0074 (0.0202) -0.0071 (0.0203) -0.0068 (0.0204)
Age at Marriage-Husb. -0.0004 (0.0005) -0.0004 (0.0005) -0.0004 (0.0005)
Age Diff.(H-W): -5 to -1 0.0030∗ (0.0021) 0.0030∗ (0.0021) 0.0030∗∗∗ (0.0021)
Age Diff.(H-W): 0 to 4 0.0044∗∗∗ (0.0014) 0.0044∗∗∗ (0.0014) 0.0044∗∗∗ (0.0014)
Age Diff.(H-W): 5 to 10 0.0084∗∗∗ (0.0030) 0.0085∗∗∗ (0.0030) 0.0085∗∗∗ (0.0030)
Age Diff.(H-W): > 10 0.0290∗∗∗ (0.0140) 0.0298∗∗∗ (0.0143) 0.0298∗∗∗ (0.0143)
Log(Duration)t−1 -0.0027∗∗∗ (0.0006) -0.0025∗∗∗ (0.0006) -0.0025∗∗∗ (0.0006)
# Prior Marriages-Husb.t−1 0.0011 (0.0010) 0.0011 (0.0010) 0.0011 (0.0010)
# Prior Marriages-Wifet−1 0.0006 (0.0009) 0.0006 (0.0009) 0.0006 (0.0009)
High School-Husb.t−1 0.0013 (0.0015) 0.0013 (0.0015) 0.0013 (0.0015)
Some College-Husb.t−1 -0.0001 (0.0015) 0.0000 (0.0015) -0.0001 (0.0015)
College-Husb.t−1 -0.0003 (0.0016) -0.0003 (0.0016) -0.0003 (0.0016)
High School-Wifet−1 -0.0015 (0.0014) -0.0016 (0.0014) -0.0016 (0.0014)
Some College-Wifet−1 -0.0009 (0.0015) -0.0009 (0.0015) -0.0010 (0.0015)
College-Wifet−1 -0.0025 (0.0014) -0.0025 (0.0014) -0.0026 (0.0014)
Black-Husb. 0.0027 (0.0020) 0.0029* (0.0020) 0.0029∗ (0.0020)
Hispanic-Husb. -0.0022 (0.0012) -0.0020 (0.0013) -0.0020 (0.0013)
Wife Same Race -0.0002 (0.0017) -0.0001 (0.0017) -0.0001 (0.0017)
# of Childrent−1 -0.0008∗ (0.0004) -0.0008∗ (0.0004)
Young Childrent−1 0.0012 (0.0012) 0.0013 (0.0012)
Log(Income)-Husb.t−1 0.0001 (0.0002)
Log(Income)-Wifet−1 0.0001 (0.0002)
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes
# of Couples 3,893 3,893 3,893
N (couple-years) 30,016 30,016 29,960
Pseudo-R2 0.1138 0.1152 0.1151
Sample weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by person ID to account for each individual being
present multiple times. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% level.
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C.1 Comparing Married Renters and Owners
Table C.1 compares the regression coefficients from fixed effects regressions for
married females owners and renters. This shows that it may be inappropriate to
include both renters and owners in a regression together as there are a number
of control variables that have very effects on labor supply across the groups.
Including both owners and renters in the regression would force the coefficients of
any variables without interaction terms to have an equal effect on labor supply.
In particular, those variables that have a significant difference in the estimated
coefficients are dealing with age, the presence of young children, and location.
Finally the year fixed effects which are almost all significantly different across the
groups.
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Table C.1: Log of Labor Hours,
Regression Coefficients of Married Females
Owner Renter Difference
Fitted Wage 3.435 3.357 0.078
Pos. House Price Shockt−1 -0.038 -0.020 -0.019
Neg. House Price Shockt−1 0.004 0.059 -0.055
Cnty Unemp. Ratet−1 -0.018 -0.035 0.017
1-2 Children 0.159 0.159 0.000
3 or More Children 0.146 0.239 -0.094
Children under 5 yrs -0.807 -0.520 -0.288*
Children 6 to 10 yrs -0.427 -0.348 -0.078
Children 11 to 15 yrs -0.150 -0.136 -0.014
Pregnant -0.073 0.054 -0.128
High School -0.346 0.195 -0.541**
Some College -0.331 0.141 -0.471
College -1.024 -0.189 -0.834
Age: 24 to 30 -0.119 0.271 -0.390
Age: 31 to 40 -0.085 0.469 -0.554*
Age: 41 to 65 -0.083 0.490 -0.574
Age: 66 to 75 -0.322 0.157 -0.480
Westt−1 0.352 1.311 -0.959
Southt−1 0.212 0.900 -0.688
Centralt−1 0.218 -0.222 0.440
Year: 1983 -0.039 0.176 -0.214*
Year: 1984 -0.059 0.421 -0.479***
Year: 1985 0.157 0.649 -0.492***
Year: 1986 -0.092 0.303 -0.395***
Year: 1987 -0.162 0.324 -0.486***
Year: 1988 -0.350 0.230 -0.580***
Year: 1989 -0.300 0.292 -0.593***
Year: 1990 -0.311 0.267 -0.578***
Year: 1991 -0.308 0.219 -0.527**
Year: 1992 -0.319 0.294 -0.612***
Year: 1993 -0.660 -0.061 -0.598**
Year: 1994 -0.588 0.168 -0.757***
Year: 1995 -0.362 0.490 -0.853***
Year: 1996 -0.454 0.277 -0.731***
Year: 1997 -0.498 0.056 -0.554
Year: 1999 -0.700 -0.288 -0.412
Year: 2001 -1.018 -0.767 -0.251
Year: 2003 -1.175 -0.755 -0.420
Year: 2005 -1.290 -0.905 -0.385
Year: 2007 -1.510 -1.136 -0.374
Year: 2009 -1.558 -1.238 -0.320
Constant -5.751 -6.972 1.221
$N$ (Person-Year) 33,335 7,319
Groups (Person) 4,566 2,066
C.2 Additional Tables
Table C.2 shows the full specification of the fixed effect model where the de-
pendent variable is the log of labor hours and the sample is for married female
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Table C.2: Full Specification: Log of Hours,
Married Females, Owners
Dependent Variable Log(Labor Hrs)
Pos. House Price Shockt−1 -0.043
(0.021)
Neg. House Price Shockt−1 0.015
(0.033)
Cnty Unemp. Ratet−1 0.010
(0.039)
# of Children -0.244
(0.072)
Children under 5 yrs -1.054
(0.073)
Children ages 6 to 10 yrs -0.563
(0.060)
Children ages 11 to 15 yrs -0.232
(0.043)
Pregnant -0.095
(0.046)
High School -0.264
(0.169)
Some College -0.010
(0.217)
College -0.267
(0.264)
Age: 24 to 30 0.216
(0.268)
Age: 31 to 40 0.608
(0.275)
Age: 41 to 65 0.889
(0.281)
Age: 66 to 75 0.311
(0.296)
Westt−1 0.306
(0.327)
Southt−1 0.045
(0.223)
Centralt−1 0.245
(0.284)
Constant 2.481
(0.382)
N (Person-Year) 34,191
Groups 4,621
R2 (within) 0.101
homeowners. This corresponds to the model used in the baseline regression of
Table 3.21.
In Table C.3, I use a constant sample of households across all specifications
of the different lengths of the house price shock, compared to Table 3.28. The
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Table C.3: Fixed Effects Model: Log of Labor Hours, Other Shock Lengths
Shock Length 1 year 2 year 3 year 4 year 6 year
Pos. House Price Shockt−1 -0.040** -0.039* -0.038* -0.032 -0.032
(0.016) (0.020) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023)
Neg. House Price Shockt−1 -0.0345 -0.010 0.001 0.025 0.011
(0.034) (0.037) (0.036) (0.034) (0.035)
Cnty Unemp. Ratet−1 -0.019* -0.021** -0.021** -0.025** -0.022**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Year Controls Y Y Y Y Y
N (Person-Year) 28,924 28,924 28,924 28,751 28,924
Groups 4,050 4,050 4,050 4,034 4,050
R2 (within) 0.097 0.097 0.097 0.097 0.097
Sample weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by person ID to account for each individual
being present multiple times. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% level.
estimated coefficients do not change by much, though the standard errors increase.
However, this is likely due mostly to the significant decrease in sample size.
Table C.4: One Year Percent Change in HPI,
Married Females, Owners
Dependent Log of Log(Labor Hrs) Employment
Variable Labor Hours Employed Only Status
Pos. Change in HPIt−1 -0.140 0.012 -0.084
(0.220) (0.083) (0.067)
Neg. Change in HPIt−1 0.0528 -0.003 -0.048
(0.323) (0.130) (0.097)
Cnty Unemp. Ratet−1 -0.019** -0.003 -0.003
(0.008) (0.003) (0.002)
Year Controls Y Y Y
N (Person-Year) 42,404 29,249 42,402
Groups 5,968 4,954 5,968
R2 (within) 0.104 0.062 0.088
Sample weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by person ID to account for each individual
being present multiple times. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
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C.3 Wage Controls and Other Household Types
The first two tables in this section shows a set of four regressions using combi-
nations of wage proxies and actual and predicted ownership status to deal with the
potential endogeneity problems described in Section 3.3.1. Results are shown for
the two main groups of interest in this paper, married women and older married
males. The first two columns use the actual homeownership status of the respon-
dents and the last two columns use the predicted homeownership status. Next,
we vary the proxy for wages from the fitted wage generated for each respondent
to the estimated average wage of a similar demographic group from census data.
Table C.5: Fixed Effects Model: Log of Labor Hours,
Married Females, Owners
Actual Ownership Status Predicted Ownership Status
Fitted Wage 3.435*** - 3.412*** -
(0.358) - (0.342) -
Estimated Avg. Wage - 0.083 - 0.072
- (0.095) - (0.090)
Pos. House Price Shockt−1 -0.038* -0.044** -0.035* -0.042**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Neg. House Price Shockt−1 0.004 0.015 0.008 0.011
(0.033) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031)
Cnty Unemp. Ratet−1 -0.018* -0.023** -0.019** -0.024***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Year Controls Y Y Y Y
N (Person-Year) 33,335 33,916 38,006 38,726
Groups 4,566 4,484 5,133 5,052
R2 (within) 0.112 0.101 0.105 0.093
Sample weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by person ID to account for each individual
being present multiple times. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% level.
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Table C.6: Fixed Effects Model: Log of Hours,
Married Men ≥65 Yrs, Owners
Actual Ownership Status Predicted Ownership Status
Fitted Wage -0.316 - -0.060 -
(1.256) - (1.181) -
Estimated Avg. Wage - 0.183** - 0.175**
- (0.083) - (0.081)
Pos. House Price Shockt−1 0.014 0.024 -0.023 -0.012
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Neg. House Price Shockt−1 0.151** 0.154** 0.116* 0.117*
(0.069) (0.068) (0.065) (0.063)
Cnty Unemp. Ratet−1 -0.010 -0.008 -0.014 -0.013
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Year Controls Y Y Y Y
N (Person-Year) 3,829 3,897 4,323 4,418
Groups 818 822 917 927
R2 (within) 0.090 0.093 0.091 0.094
Sample weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by person ID to account for each individual
being present multiple times. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% level.
The next table examines the effect of house price shocks on the labor supply on
unmarried women. I perform the analysis separately for young single women and
older single women as they are likely to be from two very different demographic
groups: younger single women homeowners are more likely never married or di-
vorced, and older single women are more likely widowed and nearing retirement.
These two groups have potentially very different labor supply choices and very
different responses to wealth shocks from each other. First focusing on younger
single female homeowners1, Table C.7 show the results at the intensive and exten-
sive margin of labor supply for each group. If we compare the group of younger
unmarried females to the older unmarried females, we see that the younger women
are more educated and are more likely to be black. The younger women also have
1Note that given the wide range of birth cohorts in the PSID, the “younger” female home-
owners in this sample are ages 53 and younger.
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Table C.7: Fixed Effects Model: Single Females, Owners
Younger Single Females Older Single Females
Dependent Log of Employment Log of Employment
Variable Labor Hours Status Labor Hours Status
Pos. House Price Shockt−1 -0.073 -0.010 -0.090 -0.011
(0.056) (0.013) (0.068) (0.019)
Neg. House Price Shockt−1 -0.1006 -0.002 -0.1470 -0.053*
(0.066) (0.019) (0.110) (0.031)
Cnty Unemp. Ratet−1 -0.003 -0.005 -0.016 -0.005
(0.019) (0.005) (0.026) (0.009)
Year Controls Y Y Y Y
N (Person-Year) 4,146 4,146 3,823 3,824
Groups 1,035 1,035 728 729
R2 (within) 0.338 0.025 0.239 0.195
Sample weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by person ID to account for each individual
being present multiple times. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% level.
considerably higher incomes, however the sample of older women includes many
retirees. We see no consistent evidence that these groups of women are affected
by house price shocks, though the sample sizes are extremely small.
Table C.8 and Table C.9 show the three different specifications for the sample of
married and unmarried male homeowners, respectively. The sample of unmarried
males are on average younger and less educated than the married males, as well
as more likely to be non-white. As has been observed in the empirical literature,
unmarried males also have lower income on average than married males, even when
controlling for age. The results are not consistently significant across specifications
for either group, as expected since these are not groups we would anticipate would
vary their labor supply much. There is some evidence that married and single
males respond to house price shocks in terms of their employment status, however
the coefficients are in the same direction as they might respond to general business
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Table C.8: Fixed Effects Model: Married Males, Owners
Dependent Log of Log(Labor Hrs) Employment
Variable Labor Hours Employed Only Status
Pos. House Price Shockt−1 0.026 -0.006 0.012**
(0.018) (0.007) (0.005)
Neg. House Price Shockt−1 0.0422 -0.007 0.010
(0.029) (0.010) (0.008)
Cnty Unemp. Ratet−1 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.007) (0.003) (0.002)
Year Controls Y Y Y
N (Person-Year) 34,448 27,697 34,446
Groups 4,557 4,207 4,557
R2 (within) 0.355 0.167 0.217
Sample weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by person ID to account for each individual
being present multiple times. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% level.
cycles so we cannot rule out that the regressions just have not controlled for labor
market conditions well enough.
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Table C.9: Fixed Effects Model: Single Males, Owners
Dependent Log of Log(Labor Hrs) Employment
Variable Labor Hours Employed Only Status
Pos. House Price Shockt−1 0.085* -0.003 0.019
(0.050) (0.017) (0.018)
Neg. House Price Shockt−1 0.1215 -0.011 0.051**
(0.088) (0.028) (0.023)
Cnty Unemp. Ratet−1 0.010 -0.003 0.000
(0.025) (0.010) (0.007)
Year Controls Y Y Y
N (Person-Year) 4,433 3,375 4,433
Groups 1,319 1,120 1,319
R2 (within) 0.227 0.146 0.116
Sample weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by person ID to account for each individual
being present multiple times. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% level.
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